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ARI EZRA WALDMAN*
ABSTRACT

Technologies that mediate social interactioncanput ourprivacy and our
safety at risk. Harassment,intimatepartnerviolence and surveillance,data
insecurity, and revenge porn are just a few of the harms that bedevil
technosocialspaces and their users, particularlyusers from marginalized
communities. This Article seeks to identify the building blocks of safe social
spaces, or environments in which individuals can share personal
information at low risk ofprivacy threats. Relying on analogies to offline
social spaces-Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, teams of coworkers, and
attorney-client relationships-thisArticle argues that if a social space is
defined as an environment characterizedby disclosure, then a safe social
space is one in which disclosure norms are counterbalancedby equally as
powerful norms of trust that are both endogenously designed in and backed
exogenously by law. Case studies of online social networks and social
robots are used to show how both the design and law governing
technosocial spaces today not only do not support trust, but actively
undermine user safety by eroding trust and limiting the law's regulatory
power. The Article concludes with both design and law reform proposalsto
better build andprotect trust and safe social spaces.
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INTRODUCTION

Our social interactions are mediated by technology. We chat with
friends, read the news, and buy things on technosocial' platforms run by the
likes of Facebook, Google, and Amazon. Alongside all of the benefits that
kind of technology offers, it can also put our privacy and safety at risk.
Scholars and media commentators have documented the rampant invasions

See Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment
1.
Implications of TechnosocialChange, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 619 (2011) (coining the term "technosocial"
to refer to the "intertwined effects of technological and social change"). This article uses "technosocial"
to refer to technologies that are either themselves social or that foster social interaction.
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cyberstalking, 5
gender-based harassment, 3 racism,'
of privacy,'
6
nonconsensual pornography, and intimate surveillance 7 on digital social
platforms. Prominent women and members of other marginalized groups
are leaving these spaces. 8 That is not only regrettable; it is dangerous for
democracy. 9 Even as scholars start to pay more attention to platform content
moderation policies that ostensibly try to create safe and welcoming
environments online,10 things are not much better on the ground. This raises
the question at the heart of this article: How can we make online social
spaces safer?
Social spaces, as I am using the phrase, are multi-actor informationsharing environments. 1 They can be physical (chatting with a friend at a
coffee shop or running into an acquaintance and her dog at the comer of
First and Main), digital (texting with someone on an online social network),
2.
See, e.g., Sam Wolfson, Amazon's Alexa Recorded Private Conversation and Sent it to
Random Contact, GUARDIAN (May 24, 2018, 6:09 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2018/may/24/amazon-alexa-recorded-conversation [https://perma.cc/NM8F-HUKB]; Issie Lapowsky,
Facebook Exposed 87 Million Users to CambridgeAnalytica, WIRED (Apr. 4, 2018, 5:43 PM), https://
www.wired.com/story/facebook-exposed-87-million-users-to-cambridge-analytica/ [https://perma.cc/K
3VS-6BYB].
3.
See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014) (documenting a variety
of forms of gender-based harassment and arguing for a civil rights agenda to combat them); Danielle
Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009) [hereinafter Citron, Cyber Civil Rights]
(arguing that gender-based harassment online is a civil rights violation).
4.
See, e.g., JESSE DANIELS, CYBER RACISM (2009); Brandon A. Robinson, "Personal
Preference" as the New Racism: Gay Desire and Racial Cleansing in Cyberspace, 2 SOC. RACE &
ETHNICITY 317 (2015).
5.
See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Spyinglnc., 72 WASH.&LEEL. REV. 1243, 1248-50 (2015)
(exploring the federal and state criminal laws that punish and deter businesses trafficking in devices that
are primarily useful for surreptitious interception of electronic communications).
6.
See Ari Ezra Waldman, Law, Privacy, and Online Dating: "Revenge Porn" in Gay Online
Communities, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY, 2019, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridgecore/content/view/BCCE05CF25AA4C2EO5CCF8D6498OE839/S0897654618000291 a.pdf/lawprivac
y_and-onlinedating revenge pomingayonline communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3HB-BB7T]
[hereinafter Waldman, Law, Privacy, and Online Dating] (documenting the phenomenon of revenge
porn in gay male online communities).
7.
See, e.g., Diana Freed et al., Digital Technologies and Intimate Partner Violence: A
Qualitative Analysis with Multiple Stakeholders, ACM ON HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION, 2017,
http://www.nix dell.com/papers/digital-technologies-intimate.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ6U-K5VD].
8.
See Catherine Piner, Feminist Writer Jessica Valenti Takes a Break from Social Media After
Threat Against Her Daughter, SLATE (July 28, 2016, 5:01 PM), https://slate.com/human6
interest/201 /07/feminist-writer-jessica-valenti-takes-a-break-from-social-media-after-threat-againsther-daughter.html [https://perma.cc/246F-A72E].
9.
See Danielle Keats Citron, Law's Expressive Value in Combatting Gender Harassment, 108
how tMICH. L. REV. 373, 391 (2009) [hereinafter Citron, Law's Expressive Value] (discussing some of
the broader harms of gender-based harassment and the silencing of women that it causes, including
entrenching traditional hierarchies and eroding the ability of women to contribute to society, generally).
10.
See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, andProcesses Governing Online
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018) (chronicling the development of content moderation policies at
Facebook and arguing that they reflect First Amendment norms).
11.
See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1-4 (1959)
[hereinafter GOFFMAN, EVERYDAY LIFE].
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or telephonic;' 2 they can be big (a party or a megachurch) or small (a oneon-one meeting); they can involve the exchange of words (during a
conversation over dinner) or body language (at a dance party or across the

3
Spaces become social when they are
room at a tiresome meeting).
constructed by persons engaged in information exchange.
As such, social spaces require us to navigate our privacy. Granted,
4
privacy and sharing are creatures of context,' and different social contexts
5
function on different disclosures.' But all social spaces operate with
6
disclosure norms; that is, we all must share something.' Because sharing
information involves some risk--disclosure inherently makes one
vulnerable to others-social spaces require risk minimization mechanisms
if they are to survive. Otherwise, we could not continue to share secrets with
our best friends, confide in loved ones, engage in commerce, or express
8
ourselves freely. 17 We would lose our sexual privacy,' our opportunities for
Although this understanding of social spaces is indebted to Goffman's work on the
12.
interaction among persons in public places, Goffman's research was focused exclusively on individuals
in the "presence of others." Id. at 1. Goffman even defines "interaction" to mean "face-to-face
interaction," as if there could be no other kind. Id. at 15. There is now a long literature applying
Goffmnan's concept of impression management to online social life. See, e.g., Liam Bullingham & Ana
C. Vasconcelos, 'The Presentation of Self in the Online World': Goffrnan and the Study of Online
Identities, 39 J. INFO. SCt. 101 (2013) (similar to offline, face-to-face interactions, internet users re-create
their offline self online, but engage in image management and persona editing); Julie E. Cohen, Privacy,
Visibility, Transparency,and Exposure, 75 U. CHt. L. REV. 181, 197-98 (2008) (selective exposure,
critical to Goffman's presentation of self, animates the different levels of privacy that some social
networking sites provide); Jennifer L. Gibbs, Nicole B. Ellison & Rebecca D. Heino, Self-Presentation
in Online Personals:The Role ofAnticipatedFutureInteraction,Self-Disclosure, andPerceivedSuccess
in Internet Dating, 33 COMM. RES. 152 (2006) (examining conditional self-disclosure in the online
dating context); Julie E. Cohen, ExaminedLives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1427 (2000) (arguing that information privacy allows us to construct Goffman's
social facades).
You can communicate quite a bit of information through body language. See, e.g., Lorenza
13.
Mondada, Challenges of Multimodality: Language and the Body in Social Interaction, 20 J.
SOCIOLINGUISTICS 336, 340-41 (2016) (discussing the challenges of studying social interaction when
language is only one modality); see also NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR AND COMMUNICATION (Aron W.
Siegman & Stanley Feldstein eds., 2d ed. 2009).
See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
14.
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 137-38 (2010) (arguing that norms of appropriateness and information flow
govern our expectations of privacy in different contexts).
See Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies, 11 AM. J. SOC. 441,
15.
442-45, 463 (1906) (arguing that our relationships with different people differ because we share certain
information with some and not with others); GOFFMAN, EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 11, at 107, 112
(noting that forms of social interaction occur in the contexts appropriate for them, and what would be
appropriate in one context might not be appropriate in another).
See GOFFMAN, EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 11, at 64; see also GEORG SIMMEL, THE
16.
SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 315-16, 326-29 (Kurt H. Wolff ed. & trans., 1950); SISSELA BOK,
SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 20, 23 (1982).
See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN.
17.
TECH. L. REV. 431, 452-56 (2016).
See Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1874 (2019) [hereinafter
18.
Citron, Sexual Privacy] (sexual privacy involves "the social norms (behaviors, expectations, and
expectations) that govern access to, and information about, individuals' intimate lives.").
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solitude,' 9 and our freedom to develop and affirm our identities as we see
fit.2 ° Creating environments where these freedoms exist is, I argue, the role
of trust, design,2' and the law.2 2 If social spaces are defined by information
exchange, safe social spaces are environments of information exchange in
which disclosure norms are counterbalanced by norms of trust backed
endogenously by design and exogenously by law.
To suggest that the buildings blocks of safe social spaces are trust,
design, and law, this article offers analogies. 23 Part I explores trust and its
effects on social behavior. Part II then shows how three paradigmatic safe
social spaces-Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, corporate teams,
and attorney-client relationships-are all endogenously designed to foster
19.
Solitude is an important value long coveted by privacy scholars. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen,
DRMand Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575,576-79 (2003) [hereinafter Cohen, DRMandPrivacy]
(identifying intellectual privacy as an important value and noting its connection to privacy and solitude);
Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008) (arguing that the ability to test out
inchoate or unpopular ideas requires freedom from social surveillance); Samuel Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890) ("The intensity and complexity of life,
attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man,
under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and
privacy have become more essential to the individual.").
20.
See IRWtN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL
SPACE, TERRITORY, CROWDING 49-50 (1975) ("when the permeability of these boundaries [to the self]
is under the control of a person a sense of individuality develops."); see also Edward J. Bloustein,
Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 973-74
(1964) (arguing that one who is subject to privacy intrusions is "less of a man, [and] has less human
dignity").
21.
The word "design" can mean many different things, from intentions (something is done "by
design") to aesthetics (a room can be designed to be visually appealing). But for the purposes of this
Article, I follow a broad definition from Don Norman, who wrote about design as a combination of
affordances, constraints, and guideposts that direct behavior in useful ways. See DON NORMAN, THE
DESIGN OF EVERYDAY THINGS 2, 9, 12-13 (1988). Sometimes, these are obvious: a wall in front of you
redirects your path. Sometimes, these are subtler: spokes on street-level window sills discourage
loitering. With respect to online spaces, I follow Woodrow Hartzog in his book, Privacy's Blueprint,
which defines design as the "processes that create consumer technologies and the results of their creative
processes instantiated in hardware and software." WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY'S BLUEPRINT: THE
BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 11 (2018) [hereinafter HARTZOG,
PRIVACY'S BLUEPRINT].
22.
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) [hereinafter
LESSIG, CODE] (noting that law, norms, markets, and technological architecture all govern conduct
online). Trust is a norm. See Francis Fukuyama, Differing DisciplinaryPerspectives on the Origins of
Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 479,480-81 (2001) [hereinafter Fukuyama, DifferingDisciplinaryPerspectives].
Design is architecture. See HARTZOG, PRIVACY'S BLUEPRINT, supra note 21, at 11.
23.
See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Premises and Conclusions: Symbolic Logic for Legal Analysis:
The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 517 (1998); Scott Brewer, Exemplary
Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 923, 937 (1996); Ronald Dworkin, In Praiseof Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353 (1996); James R.
Murray, The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 833 (1982); Frederic
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106
HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993). There are, of course, other relationships that offer informative analogies,
including, in particular, the social relationship established between investigative reporters and their
sources. The three discussed in this article are emblematic of safe social spaces.
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the kind of trust, confidentiality, and discretion needed to facilitate
disclosure.24 And because society benefits from disclosures in each of these
contexts, 25 the law exogenously supports designed-in norms of trust to
ensure those spaces are safe for sharing personal, secret, or stigmatizing
information.
Technosocial spaces, however, lack both endogenous and exogenous
structures that support trust. Far from it. As I discuss in Part III, these spaces
are actually designed to manipulate us and lull us into false senses of
familiarity and confidence, thereby enticing risky disclosure. And they do
so in a legal and regulatory void that leaves users unprotected and
vulnerable to invasions of privacy and online harassment.
But it doesn't have to be that way. Technosocial spaces can learn from
safe social spaces offline and reorient design and law to foster trust. Robust
approaches to privacy- and safety-by-design can protect users from the
inside,26 and stronger legal responses to manipulative design and online
harassment can restore trust when something goes wrong. These proposals
are outlined in Part TV.

24.

See

ARi

EZRA

WALDMAN,

PRIVACY

AS TRUST:

INFORMATION

PRIVACY

FOR

AN

INFORMATION AGE 54-60 (2018) [hereinafter WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST] (showing that trust
among social actors is essential for sharing personal information).
For some examples of the scholarly literature on the benefits of sharing and disclosure in
25.
addiction recovery, please see, e.g., Irwin Altman, Reciprocity ofInterpersonalExchange, 3 J. THEORY
SOC. BEHAVIOUR 249 (1973); Kathryn P. Davison, James W. Pennebaker & Sally W. Dickerson, Who
Talks? The Social Psychologistof Illness Support Groups, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 205 (2000); Dalmas
A. Taylor, The Development of InterpersonalRelationships: Social PenetrationProcesses, 75 J. SOC.
PSYCH. 79 (1968). For the value generated by free sharing among corporate teams, please see, e.g., Amy
C. Edmondson, The Local and Variegated Nature of Learning in Organizations: A Group-Level
Perspective, in SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS:

STRUCTURES AND RELATIONSHIPS

631 (Mary

Goodwyn & Jody Hoffer Gittel eds., 2012) [hereinafter Edmondson, Learning in Organizations]
(discussing how teams of coworkers work together and share information to enhance organizational
learning); Morten T. Hansen, The Search-Transfer Problem: The Role of Weak Ties in Sharing
Knowledge Across OrganizationSubunits, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 82, 105 (1999) (showing that complex
information is difficult to transmit between corporate department teams); David Lazer & Allan
Friedman, The Network Structure of Exploration and Exploitation, 52 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 667 (2007)
(considering how network structure affects communication among teams and, ultimately, system
performance). And to understand the benefits to society from the free flow of information between
clients and attorneys, please see, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("sound
legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and ... depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by
the client"); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) ("the advocate and counselor... [must]
know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be
carried out."); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (assistance of counsel "can only be safely
and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure"); see also
Geoffrey Hazard, An HistoricalPerspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061,
1061 (1978) (noting that the privilege allows an attorney to prepare a case and effectively advocate).
Privacy by design is the notion that privacy should be part of the development process of
26.
new technologies rather than tacked on at the end. For two comprehensive approaches to defining
privacy by design, please see HARTZOG, PRIVACY'S BLUEPRINT, supra note 21; see also An Ezra
Waldman, Privacy's Law of Design, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1239 (2019) [hereinafter Waldman,
Privacy's Law ofDesign].
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There is no perfectly safe space, digital or otherwise. Even better design,
comprehensive federal and state laws, and private ordering cannot account
for all human mischief. But in a modem world in which sharing is, if not
always mandatory, expected, law and design can make social spaces safer
by supporting and protecting trust and repairing it when it breaks down.

I. TRUST AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE
Although scholars bring different modalities to the study of trust, there
is remarkable overlap in the way different fields conceptualize the concept.
That literature has been discussed in depth elsewhere.2 7 A chief take away
from that scholarship is that trust is an essential element of online social
governance. Joel Reidenberg 28 and Lawrence Lessig 29 predicted this when
they argued that law, architecture, markets, and norms work together to
regulate online conduct. Trust is one of those norms and, therefore, an
important focal point for the study of technosocial spaces.
A. What is Trust?
Robert Putnam and Francis Fukuyama think about trust as
epiphenomenal with social capital. For Putnam, social capital is a "feature
of social organizations ... that facilitates coordination and cooperation for
mutual benefit. ' ' 30 Fukuyama goes a step further, arguing that social capital
consists of norms or values, "instantiated in an actual relationship among
two or more people, that promote cooperation between them., 31 On a micro
level, social capital constitutes the advantages and benefits that individuals
realize owing to their connections with others, like coworkers learning from
one another and cooperating to achieve a goal32 or social groups from
diverse backgrounds whose experiences are enhanced because of their
diversity.3 3 Social capital also develops on a more macro level, among
27.
See WALDMAN. PRIVACY AS TRUST, supra note 24, at 51-60; see also Richards & Hartzog,
supra note 17.
28.
See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554-55 (1998) ("The creation and implementation of
information policy are embedded in network designs and standards as well as in system
configurations.").
29.
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, VERSION 2.0 (2006).

30.
Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY
65, 67 (1995); see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000).
31.
32.

Fukuyama, Differing DisciplinaryPerspectives, supra note 22, at 480.
See, e.g., Michael Useem & Jerome Karabel, Pathways to Top CorporateManagement, 51

AM. SOc. REV. 184 (1986).

33.
(1997).

See, e.g., Ronald S. Burt, The Contingent Value of Social Capital,42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 339
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individuals in larger communities and nations and even among nations and
peoples.3 4 In all cases, social capital refers to the good things that develop
out of our connections to others.
Trust is one of those good things. Trust is a resource of social capital
concerning the expectations that others will behave according to accepted
norms. 35 It is the "favorable expectation regarding other people's actions
and intentions," 36 or the belief that others will behave in a predictable
manner. For example, if I ask a friend to hold my spare set of keys, I trust
she will not break in and steal from me. When an individual speaks with
relative strangers in a support group like AA, she trusts that they will not
divulge her secrets. 37 Trust, therefore, includes a willingness to accept some
risk and vulnerability toward others and steps in to grease the wheels of
social activity in the absence of perfect knowledge: I cannot know for
certain that my neighbor will not abuse her key privileges or that my fellow
support group members will keep my confidences. As Niklas Luhmann has
38
stated, trust begins where knowledge ends. As such, trust allows me to
interact with and rely on others.
Trust is essential online. Nearly two decades ago, Helen Nissenbaum
presciently noted that trust is "key to the promise the online world holds for
great and diverse benefits to humanity," including richer communities,
engaged politics, and robust commerce, because "[p]eople shy away from
territories they distrust., 39 That is just as true today. Corporate executives
talk about ensuring a steady stream of customer data by gaining user trust
and confidence."a Apple asks us if we "Trust this browser?" when we log in
to iCloud on a new device. In 2013, Facebook conducted a study of its users
41
to determine "how trustworthy" they think Facebook is overall. The

34.

See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY

(1995).
See Alejandro Portes & Julia Sensenbrenner, Embeddedness and Immigration:Notes on the
35.
Social Determinants of Economic Action, 98 AM. J. SOC. 1320, 1332 (1993).
Guido M6llering, The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of Expectation,
36.
Interpretationand Suspension, 35 SOC. 403, 404 (2001); see also Ken Newton & Sonja Zmerli, Three
Forms of Trust and Their Association, 3 EUR. POL. SCi. REV. 169, 171 (2011); J. David Lewis & Andrew
Weigert, Trust as Social Reality, 63 SOCIAL FORCES 967, 968 (1985).
See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, UNDERSTANDING ANONYMITY (2018), https://www.aa.org/
37.

pages/en US/understanding-anonymity [https://perma.cc/8A8D-HLG3] [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING

ANONYMITY].
See NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER 5 (Howard Davies, John Raffan & Kathryn
38.

Rooney trans., Tom Burns & Gianfranco Poggi eds., 2017) (1979).
Helen Nissenbaum, Securing Trust Online: Wisdom or Oxymoron, 81 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636
39.
(2001).
See Timothy Morey et al., Customer Data: Designingfor Transparency and Trust, HARV.
40.
BUS. REV., May 2015, at 96.
See Brian Fung, Facebook Wants to Know If Your Trust It. But It's Keeping All the2Answers
41.
3 2
to Itself, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/ 01 /1 /
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Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 42 and the California Attorney General's
Office 43 couch their recommendations for transparency in corporate data use
as a way of inspiring consumer trust. And the work of scholars like Kirsten
Martin shows that failing to meet the privacy expectations of users
negatively impacts the trust those users have in the website and reduces user
willingness to share.4 4

B. How Does Trust Develop?
Trust, like other norms of social life, can develop hierarchically from
above. For example, legal rules can influence norms of behavior through
the law's expressive power, 45 as when the Supreme Court declares racebased discrimination illegal and, over time, the illegality of discrimination
is accepted as a moral imperative.4 6 Fiduciary laws, medical malpractice
law, and legally enforced canons of ethics are just three of the myriad rules
and private ordering schemes that support trust norms from above.
Norms can also be influenced by design, as when a builder puts spikes
on first floor window sills to prevent loitering and thereby influences
community norms about private property, community, and vagrancy.4 7
31 /facebook-wants-to-know-if-you-trust-it-but-its-keeping-all-the-answers-t-itsef/
[https://perma.cc/
43PA-83CU].
42.
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST THROUGH
TRANSPARENCY 3-4 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/mobile-privacydisclosures-building-trust-through-transparency-federal-trade-commission-staff-report/ 30201 mobilep
rivacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/43PA-83CU]; see also Protecting Mobile Privacy. Your
Smartphones, Tablets, Cell Phones and Your Privacy, HearingBefore the Subcomm. for Privacy, Tech.
& the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 90 (2011) (statement of Alan Davidson,
Director of Public Policy, Google, Inc.).
43.
See CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MAKING YOUR PRIVACY PRACTICES PUBLIC:
RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEVELOPING A MEANINGFUL PRIVACY POLICY 4 (2014), https://oag.ca.gov/sit
es/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cybersecurity/makingyourprivacypracticespublic.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2L
NN-KRHQ].

44.

See Kirsten Martin, Understanding Privacy Online: Development of a Social Contract

Approach to Privacy, 137 J. BUS. ETHICS 551 (2016).
45.
See, e.g., Citron, Law's Expressive Value, supra note 9, at 407; Deborah Hellman, The
Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1, 3 n.10 (2000) (law is coercive and
expressive of norms); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard M. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1570-71 (2000) (what the law is establishes a set of
agreed upon values).
46.
See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2043
(1996); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 158 (1999). This is not to say that norm generation through law's expressive power is perfect.
Discrimination, white supremacy, and other odious forms of bigotry are still far too common today.
Court decisions haven't changed that. See BRIAN LEVIN & JOHN DAVID REITZEL, CTR. FOR THE STUDY
OF HATE & EXTREMISM, REPORT TO THE NATION: HATE CRIMES RISE IN U.S. CITIES AND COUNTIES IN
TIME OF DIVISION & FOREIGN INTERFERENCE 3-4 (2018), https://csbs.csusb.edu/sites/csusb-csbs/files/
2018%2OHate%2OFinal%20Report%205-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFM5-M6BL].
47.
See UNPLEASANT DESIGN (Gordan Savicic & Selena Savic eds., 2013) (collecting and
analyzing myriad common examples of how the design of mostly public spaces can deter antisocial
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When technologies mediate social interaction, code plays this role,
mandating or guiding norms of behavior online, 4' as when platforms
automatically screen out content from sites like InfoWars or Gateway
Punditin an attempt to algorithmically combat conspiracy theories and fake
news, 49 or when digital rights management prohibits reproduction of
copyrighted material.5 °
Norms of trust can also emerge from below, through experience or
explicit or implicit social cues. Experience gives us more data from which
to judge the trustworthiness of others; keeping a friend's confidences for ten
years gives them a stronger basis for trust than a single day. Explicit ("this
is between us") and implicit cues (physically turning away from a crowd,
51
huddling down, whispering) can also generate expectations of trust. As
52
can reciprocity, which establishes mutual vulnerability and helps generate
53 Cues also allow us to trust
mutual feelings of cooperation and altruism.
strangers. For example, two people who share a stigmatizing social identity
often create an instant bond of trust based on a shared set of narratives and
experiences.5 4 We are more willing to interact with others the more
embedded they are in a familiar social network. 5 We tend to trust experts
and professionals based on their degrees, transferring the trust we have in a
school's reputation, which we know, to one of its graduates, whom we do

behavior, from uncomfortable benches and window sill spikes that discourage people from sitting or
lying down to unflattering light that deters everything from congregation to intravenous drug use).
See LESSIG, CODE, supra note 22.
48.
See, e.g., Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Fake Election News Stories
49.
OutperformedReals News on Facebook,BuZZFEEDNEWS (Nov. 16,2016,4:15 PM), https://www.buzzf
eed.com/craigsilverman/viral- fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook [https://perma.
cc/M7DS-NA4S].
See Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 223 24 (2007)
50.
("The Internet of digital rights management, take-down notices, and content filtering is a colony, in
which permissible interactions are rigidly structured in the interest of an assertedly greater social
good."); see also Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 19, at 580-86 (describing how DRM are
designed to constrain user behavior).
See ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES 173 (1963) (noting how conversations
51.
in public closed to others may sometimes involve "huddling" down to keep confidences).
See, e.g., Nancy R. Buchan, Rachel T.A. Croson & Robyn M. Dawes, Swift Neighbors and
52.
PersistentStrangers: A Cross-CulturalInvestigationof Trust andReciprocity in Social Exchange, 108
AM. J. SOC. 168, 170 (2002) (recognizing the vulnerability that emerges out of sharing information with
others).
See Fukuyama, Differing Disciplinary Perspectives, supra note 22, at 491-93; see also
53.
WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST, supra note 24, at 53.
See Michele Williams, In Whom We Trust: Group Membership as an Affective Contextfor
54.
Trust Development, 26 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 377, 381-82, 385 (2001) (providing survey and
experimental evidence of the power of associational membership to influence trust in others).
See, e.g., Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
55.
Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 490 (1985).
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not.56 And we often choose doctors based on recommendations from friends
57
or colleagues.
These mechanisms of trust generation operate online, as well. On dating
apps, for example, users protect themselves by ensuring reciprocal sharing
of personal information and images." They listen to cues through extended
text messaging. 59 Queer users tend to trust other queer users online because
of a sense of shared struggle. 60 And we are willing to share more information
on platforms like Facebook when we see more of our friends and intimates
sharing, as well. 6' As James Grimmelmann has noted, all of our trusted
friends "can't be wrong" that Facebook, or any other platform, is a safe
place to interact. 62 Together, these endogenous forces foster organic trust
and allow social interaction to occur.
II.

SAFE SOCIAL SPACES

But trust cannot operate alone. Design and law must work together to
buttress trust norms and ensure safe and socially beneficial disclosures. And
we see it work all the time: AA meetings, corporate teams, and attorneys
and their clients are just three examples. This Part describes trust-enhancing
design and law in each.
Participants in AA meetings need to share information without fear that
their condition, which unfortunately remains stigmatized,6 3 will be
publicized. Therefore, meetings are designed with mutually enforced strict
confidentiality rules and operating structures that engender norms of trust.
Privacy torts are also available in case something goes wrong.6 4 Similarly,
56.
See Patricia M. Doney et al., Understanding the Influence of National Culture on the
Development of Trust, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 601, 607 (1998) (discussing the role of transference of
trust).

57.
See Roni Caryn Rabin, You Can Find Dr. Right, with Some Effort, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29,
2008), www.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/health/30find.html [https://perma.cc/7H8N-9FSC].
58.
See Waldman, Law, Privacy, and Online Dating, supra note 6.
59.
See id.
60.
See id.
61.
See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Sharing,and Trust: The Facebook Study, 67 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 193 (2016) [hereinafter Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust]; see also Alessandro Acquisti,
Leslie K. John & George Loewenstein, The Impact of Relative Standards on the Propensity to Disclose,
49 J. MARKETING RES. 160, 162 (2012) ("[W]hen people are surrounded by others who are revealing
intimate details about their lives, they may conform to the prevailing norm of divulgence.").
62.
James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1161 (2009).
63.
See, e.g., Georg Schomerus et al., The Stigma ofAlcohol Dependence Compared with Other
Mental Disorders:A Review of PopulationStudies, 46 ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 105 (2011) (showing
that alcohol-dependent persons tend to be viewed as far more responsible for their actions and provoke
more social rejection and negative emotions from others than those living with substance-unrelated
mental disorders); see also Robin Room, Stigma, SocialInequality andAlcohol andDrug Use, 24 DRUG
& ALCOHOL REV. 143 (2005) (significant stigma associated with alcohol and drug abuse contributes to
exclusion of those most in need of social support).
64.
See infra Part ILA.
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corporate teams working toward productivity goals must share ideas and
learn from each other without having to worry that one member is going to
decamp to a competitor (or a competing team within a company) with inside
information. To mitigate that risk, workers deploy informal tactics to
determine trust in team members on the ground, employers write in noncompete clauses into contracts, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA) and the law of trade secrets limit what workers can take with them
when they switch jobs.6 5 Finally, individuals seeking counsel must be able
to share details of their cases in order to obtain effective representation.
Therefore, they rely on heuristics and personal recommendations to find
lawyers they trust. And they do so in a context in which the legal profession
itself has set up powerful ethical guidelines that carry punishments for
noncompliance and in which malpractice law protects victims from
negligent attorneys.6 6 In all three of these case studies, endogenous design
and exogenous law reinforce trust norms among social actors, keeping the
contexts safe for intimate disclosures.
A. Alcoholics and NarcoticsAnonymous
Disclosure is written into the DNA of AA. Individuals attend meetings
to "share their experience, strength and hope with each other" in order to
recover.6 7 Meetings function with both narrative and discussion, where
members introduce themselves and share stories about how alcohol has
impacted their lives. After the narrative, other members may add their own
perspective, share similar or related stories, or make suggestions on how to
deal with an impulse to drink. Discussion ensues, or the meeting turns to
other members who volunteer to introduce themselves as alcoholics and
share their stories. 68 All AA members engage in "[m]eeting and talking and
See infra Part II.B.
65.
See infra Part II.C.
66.
ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, THIS IS A.A.: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE A.A. RECOVERY
67.
PROBLEM 2 (2017) https://www.aa.org/assets/enUS/p-lthisisaal.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2XR-MTK
T] [hereinafter THIS Is A.A.] It should be noted here that neither AA nor Narcotics Anonymous (NA)
are perfect organizations. Its effectiveness is up for debate, and many criticize its inclusion of "god" in
its literature and twelve steps. Given that anyone can attend a meeting as long as they admit their lack
of control over alcohol consumption, AA can also be dangerous. See, e.g., LANCE DODES & ZACHARY
DODES, THE SOBER TRUTH: DEBUNKING THE BAD SCIENCE BEHIND 12-STEP PROGRAMS AND THE

REHAB INDUSTRY (2014) (finding AA's success rate at just five to eight percent of people); Twelve Steps
to Dangers: How Alcoholics Anonymous Can Be a Playground for Violence-Prone Members,

PROPUBLICA (Nov. 29, 2014, 7:10 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-alcoholicsanonymous-can-be-a-playground-for-violence [https://perma.cc/Q8MG-W2PE]. I take no position on
the effectiveness of AA. The purpose of briefly profiling AA here is to show that it is a social space,
with powerful disclosure norms that are backed by norms of trust.
See, e.g., E.J. Khantzian & John E. Mack, How AA Works and Why It's Importantfor
68.
Clinicians to Understand, Il J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 77, 86-87 (1995) (discussing the

importance of storytelling through case vignette).
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helping other" 69 participants because only through sharing stories can
members "observe[] and follow[] the successful experience[s]" of those
who are sober.70
The long scholarly literature on AA 7 1 shows that disclosure is essential.
Disclosure transforms participants into their own therapists. 72 It reinforces
self-identification as having a substance abuse problem, a threshold step to
recovery. And testifying about experiences brings new members into the
73
fold by giving them models to follow and proving that they are not alone.
Trust is what allows AA members to meet their disclosure obligations in
safety. Trust organically develops in each AA meeting because all
participants start by knowing exactly one thing about each other: they all
share a stigmatizing identity. Familiarity has long been understood by social
scientists as a basis for trust among persons. Max Weber thought that shared
Protestantism allowed people who did not really know each other to trust
that they would be competent contractual partners.74 It signaled their
common values. Sharing an out-group identity signals a common narrative
and common struggle, as well, both of which influence values. 75 Everyone
in AA shares a common and difficult relationship with alcohol. They

69.
THIS IS A.A., supra note 67, at 8.
70.
Id. at 13.
71.
The literature on AA is largely about its effectiveness and, therefore, far beyond the scope of
this Article. See, e.g., Lee Ann Kaskutas, Alcoholics Anonymous Effectiveness: Faith Meets Science, 28
J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 135 (2009) (reviewing the literature on AA effectiveness); Henry A.
Montgomery, William R. Miller & Scott Tonigan, Does Alcoholics Anonymous Involvement Predict
Treatment Outcome, 12 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 241, 245 (1995) (showing that attending AA
meetings did not have a statistically significant effect on sobriety after inpatient treatment compared to
non-attenders); Rudolf H. Moos & Bernice S. Moos, Participation in Treatment and Alcoholics
Anonymous: A 16-Year Follow-Up of Initially UntreatedIndividuals, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCH. 735, 74546 (2006) (finding that individuals who participated in AA for twenty-seven weeks or more had better
sixteen-year alcohol-related outcomes than those who did not participate in any AA meetings).
72.
See Frank Reissman, The 'Helper' Therapy Principle, 10 Soc. WORK 27, 27-28 (1965)
(noting that sharing one's story can provide both help to others and personal benefit).
73.
Although there is fierce debate over the effectiveness of self-help programs, there is
considerably less disagreement in the clinical psychology literature about the self-help benefits of selfdisclosure, narrative, and testimony, whether in a clinician's office or elsewhere. See, e.g., JOHN
MCLEOD, NARRATIVE AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (1997); see also James W. Pennebaker & Janel D. Seagal,
Forming a Story: The Health Benefits of Narrative, 55 J. CLINICAL PSYCH. 1243, 1243-44 (1999) (the
act of writing down a personal narrative can contribute to positive mental health benefits); JoAnne
Banks-Wallace, Emancipatory Potential of Storytelling in a Group, 30 J. NURSING SCHOLAR. 17, 1718 (1998) (discussing the importance of narrative storytelling in advancing the mental health of African
women).
74.
See MAX WEBER, The ProtestantSects and the Spirit of Capitalism, in FROM MAX WEBER:
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 302, 312 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946).
75.
See Martin Tanis & Tom Postmes, A Social Identity Approach to Trust: Interpersonal
Perception, Group Membership and Trusting Behaviour, 35 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 413 (2005) (finding
that when individuals are not identifiable, trusting behavior is based on expectations of reciprocity
inferred from group membership); Williams, supra note 54, at 381, 385 (discussing how "[p]eople tend
to associate positive beliefs and feelings with the groups to which they belong").
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reciprocally share their stories, building the kind of mutual vulnerability that
generates trust. As a result, when AA members notice an acquaintance at a
not to worry: AA expects that members will
meeting, AA advises ' them
"respect your privacy. 76 AA literature also notes that "experience suggests
that AA members.., are vigilant" about protecting confidentiality, only use
77
first names, and maintain personal anonymity in the media. Members
behave like this on their own because of the common struggle they share.
These organic norms of trust are supported by design. AA designs in trust
by creating rules of confidentiality. Anonymity is the "spiritual foundation"
of AA. 7 8 According to AA's founder, appropriately only known as Bill W.,
anonymity provides "protection for the newcomer, respect and support of
the outside world, and security from those of us who would use A.A. for
sick and selfish purposes. '79 The knowledge commons of AA are, therefore,
governed by rules, guidelines, and suggestions that buttress the already
meetings.8 0
strong confidentiality norms that develop immediately at AA
And the confidentiality of AA meetings can also be buttressed by law.
Although cases here are few and far between for obvious reasons-namely,
filing suit for being exposed by another as a member of AA requires going
public about the plaintiff's membership 8 1-a few courts have supported the
privacy expectations of AA members based on the norms of trust inherent
in AA itself. In State v. Ashworth,82 for example, police officers
investigating a report of gun shots interrupted an AA meeting, pulled
Ashworth outside, and conducted several field sobriety tests that put his
83
blood-alcohol content above the legal limit. Because the police lacked a
warrant, Ashworth moved to suppress evidence of the alcohol concentration
in his blood. 84 The trial court stated that Ashworth's expectation of privacy

76.
77.

See UNDERSTANDING ANONYMITY, supra note 37, at 8.
Id. at 12.

See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, A.A. GUIDELINES (2017), https://www.aa.org/assets/en US/
78.
mg-18 intemet.pdf [https://perma.ccaTF45-NTPM] [hereinafter A.A. GUIDELINES]; Anonymity is the
Spiritual Foundation,NA WAY MAG., July 2002, at 6, https://www.na.org/admin/include/spaw2/uploa
ds/pdf/naway/en/usnawayjul2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5RJ-KNQJ].
A.A. GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at 1.
79.

The term "knowledge commons" refers to information that is a shared resource. That the
80.
people in a given AA meeting are all alcoholics is an example of a piece of knowledge in common to
everyone at that meeting. See GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS (Katherine J. Strandburg,

Michael J. Madison & Brett Frischmann eds., 2014).
It is, of course, possible to plead pseudonymously or anonymously in litigation. See, e.g.,
81.
Joan Steinman, Public Trial,Pseudonymous Parties: When Should Litigantsbe Permittedto Keep Their
Identities Confidential?, 37 HASTING L.J. 1 (1985) (providing an analytical scheme for determining

when pseudonymity in litigation should be allowed).
228 P.3d 381 (Idaho 2010).
82.
Id. at 382.
83.
Id. at 382. Because Ashworth had a previous DUI conviction, his alcohol concentration of
84.
above 0.20 meant that he had committed a felony under Idaho law. Id. (citing IDAHO CODE § 18-8004C).
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rested on "his and society's understanding of the privacy afforded by
attendance at an AA meeting." The court explained:
Certainly, if a group member admitted during a meeting that he had
driven to the meeting while drunk, neither society nor members
would consider that information public currency. The nature of
Alcoholics Anonymous conveys an objective understanding of a
group that protects the anonymity of its members. Information
imparted to the group in a meeting where the privacy of those
attending is expected is intended to be held in confidence by other
members.8 5
The Idaho trial court in Ashworth was willing to stand behind and support
86
that built-in trust norm.
The Ashworth court is not alone in using the law to support the trust and
confidentiality norms of AA meetings. In Harfordv. City of Santa Clarita,87
a town resident and nonsmoker petitioned the court to order the township
police to enforce a municipal no-smoking ordinance outside a meeting place
of the Rafters Group, the local chapter of AA. 88 The ordinance made
smoking illegal in public places, but exempted so-called "private clubs" and
gave city officials discretion to interpret and apply the law. 89 The Rafters
argued that it fell within the exemption. After several notifications of
smoking in violation of the ordinance, city officials declined to enforce the
law, arguing that AA fell under the private club exception. 9° The appellate
court agreed, noting that it was entirely reasonable for city officials to
consider the privacy normally afforded to AA meetings to determine that it
was a private club entitled to conduct its meetings pursuant to privacy and
association rights guaranteed by the California Constitution. 91

In the United Kingdom, where the law of confidence is far more
developed than in the United States, 92 the law protects the trust that
organically develops inside support groups. In one famous example, the
85.

Id. at 385.

86.
This motion to suppress was ultimately rejected by the intermediate appellate court, but not
because it found the trial court wrong in its use of law to support AA's trust norms. Rather, it was a
problem of evidence. Ashworth had not bothered to prove at trial that he had both a subjective and
objective expectation of privacy in the AA meeting. The court, therefore, reversed the grant of the motion
to suppress based on clear precedent requiring a high evidentiary showing from similar petitioners. Id.
at 385-86.
87.
No. B144255, 2002 WL 27113 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2002).

88.

Id. at *1.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *5-11.
92.
See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 145-73 (2007).
89.
90.
91.
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supermodel Naomi Campbell sued the British tabloid, The Mirror, after it
published a photograph of her leaving a Narcotics Anonymous (NA)
meeting.9 3 Although she admitted the public may have an interest in news
was
about her, Ms. Campbell nevertheless argued that publishing the picture
9 4 The
NA.
of
member
a
as
expect
should
she
that
privacy
the
of
an invasion
House of Lords agreed. Lord Hope wrote that "the details of Miss
Campbell's attendance at Narcotics Anonymous [were] private information
5
which imported a duty of confidence." 9 Lady Hale, also in the majority,
called both the fact of NA attendance and any information disclosed in NA
meetings "obviously private" and "both private and confidential, because it
related to an important aspect of Miss Campbell's physical and mental
mental
health., 96 To hold otherwise would risk Ms. Campbell's and others'
9' Although
meetings.
AA
or
NA
at
attendance
future
health by discouraging
98
the relative weakness of the tort of breach of confidentiality and the
enormous newsworthiness exception to the tort of public disclosure of
private facts 99 would make Ms. Campbell's case more difficult in the United
States, it is clear that law can and has supported the organic and privately
ordered trust norms that make programs like AA and NA work.
B. Teams of Coworkers
The information exchanged among coworkers may be different than the
kind of information shared among AA members. But information sharing is
no less essential to achieving the team's socially beneficial productivity
goals. Teams are, after all, the fundamental work unit of most

Campbell v. MGN Ltd. [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 (Eng.).
93.
Id.at [2]. There was some disagreement among the Lords about the proper claim for the case.
94.
Suffice it to say, regardless of which tort was operative in this case, the House of Lords was willing to

recognize that British common law can recognize and support the confidentiality norms embedded in
AA as legitimate expectations of privacy.
Id. at [95].
95.
Id. at [147].
96.
Id.at [155].
97.
98.

But see Ari Ezra Waldman, A Breach of Trust: Fighting "Revenge Porn", 102 IOWA L. REV.

709, 722-28 (2016) (arguing that there no doctrinal barriers to the expansion of the breach of
confidentiality tort in the United States).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D. The newsworthiness exception has been
99.
broadly interpreted, making it difficult for both well-known and even private individuals to recover
under the tort of public disclosure. See, e.g., Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th
Cir. 1993) ("[T]he First Amendment greatly circumscribes the right even of a private figure to obtain
damages for the publication of newsworthy facts about him, even when they are facts of a kind that
people want very much to conceal."); Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.
1940) (holding that intimate details of a former public figure's private life are not entitled to kept out of
the press).
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organizations. 0 0 Teams of coworkers make hiring decisions in midsized
and large organizations; engineers work together to build technology
products; juries decide guilt. Scholars have found increased knowledge
transfer within and among teams in organizations correlate with complex
problem solving,' 0' better productivity and performance,0 2 and
0 4
organizational learning,' 0 3 or company-wide adaptions to new realities.1
These benefits are based on the capacity of discussion and sharing to
increase the pool of available knowledge, allowing teams to make
05
theoretically better, more accurate, and more reflective decisions.
Norms of disclosure are, therefore, built into teams. Discussion is the
bread and butter of team function, with discussion structures varying
widely.' 06 Team members are expected to share stories and insights during
work, 0 7 provide feedback, 10 8 and discuss together how best to solve
complex problems.'0 9 One study of software and hardware design teams
showed that information sharing is an essential part of the design process.
Design teams, which are usually constituted by individuals or subgroups
working on specific parts of the larger product, often hold weekly meetings
100.

See PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE: THE ART & PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING

ORGANIZATION (2006); Paul Osterman, How Common is Workplace Transformation and Who Adopts
It?, 47 INDUS. LAB. RELATIONS REV. 172 (1994).
101. See, e.g., Lazer & Friedman, supra note 25, at 668-69.
102. See, e.g., Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus & Leslie A. DeChurch, Information Sharing and Team
Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 535 (2009) (reviewing 72 independent studies,
covering 4,795 total groups with 17,279 persons, and finding that information sharing positively
predicted team performance across all levels); Morten T. Hansen, Knowledge Networks: Explaining
Effective Knowledge Sharingin Multiunit Companies, 13 ORG. SCI. 232 (2002) (finding that increased
knowledge sharing among company units contributed to faster completion of projects).
103. See, e.g., Edmondson, Learning in Organizations, supra note 25, at 633-37 (linking team
learning to organizational leaming and adaptation).
104. Id. at 631 (defining organizational learning as "a process of improving organizational actions
through better knowledge and understanding").
105. Notably, this does not always work. In a famous study conducted by the psychologists Garold
Stasser and William Titus in 1985, the researchers showed that group discussion is often biased toward
already shared or commonly known information, rather than the new information from which teams
could benefit. Stasser and Titus found, then, that a team can confirm previously held views rather than
open team members to new ideas. See Garold Stasser & William Titus, Poolingof UnsharedInformation
in Group Decision Making: Biased Information Sampling During Discussion,48 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 1467, 1467-68 (1985). The balance of research still suggests that knowledge and
information sharing in teams can be successful and is positively correlated with various positive social
outcomes. See Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, supra note 102, at 535-41 (reviewing the literature after
1985).
106. See Gwen M. Wittenbaum & Jonathan M. Bowman, A Social Validation Explanationfor
Mutual Enhancement, 40 J. EXPER. SOC. PSYCH. 169 (2004) (discussing how different models of
discussion, including the role of positive feedback, affect information gathering in teams).
107. See John Seely Brown & Paul Duquid, OrganizationalLearning and Communities-ofPractice:Toward a Unified View of Working, Learning, and Innovation, 2 ORG. SCI. 40, 40-41 (1991).
108. See Teresa K. Lant, Aspiration LevelAdaptation: An EmpiricalExploration, 38 MGMT. SCI.
623, 624 (1992) (finding that teams respond to performance feedback).
109. See Lazer & Friedman, supra note 25, at 668-69.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1554

[VOL. 96:1537

where they learn about each other's progress. Both leaders and team
members expect that everyone will share their work, new information that
impacts the team's responsibilities, and questions that have come up during
design.' 10 And questions always come up; new information, whether from
other teams, suppliers, managers, mentors, or scholars, is always needed to
complete the design phase.' 1 ' Therefore, team members work together to
identify the best sources of information, collaborate with others in the
company, and conduct outside research. Primarily, though, team members
talk to each other: diverse team members often have answers or
recommendations on where to turn. Serendipitous encounters outside
offices or in hallways also help share information, and project managers are
usually12 expected to mediate and find connections that help fill information
gaps.'
Just like sharing in AA meetings is necessary for recovery, sharing in
teams is necessary for productivity. And norms of trust are essential to
sustain both types of sharing. Trust gives coworkers the comfort and safety
14 and to suggest new
to share ideas freely, 1 3 to reflect on performance,
without fear of opportunistic behavior from wouldways of doing business
5
1
competitors."
be
Also like AA, where trust organically exists in testimonial meetings
6
because each member shares a stigmatizing social identity," some level of
trust exists organically in corporate teams by virtue of their shared
membership in the organization and shared goal of production. The
management scholars Wenpin Tsai and Sumantra Ghoshal called this
phenomenon the result of a "shared vision" that helps a team or network
direct their efforts.' 17 Having a shared vision, common membership, and
18
identical goals bonds teammates together, creating a foundation of trust.
Trust also organically develops within teams that exhibit stable membership
over time. Learning depends, at least in some part, on memories of
individuals: a team member can only advise against repeating mistakes if
110. See Steven Poltrock et al., Information Seeking and Sharing in Design Teams, 2003 INT.
ACM SIGGROUP CONF. ON SUPPORTING GRP. WORK 239,240-41.
111. Id. at 242.
112. Id. at 244.
113.

Amy Edmondson, PsychologicalSafety andLearning Behavior in Work Teams, 44 ADMIN.

SCI. Q. 350, 350 (1999) [hereinafter Edmondson, Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior].
114.

See Edmondson, Learning in Organizations supra note 25, at 633-34.

115.

See, e.g., Andrew C. Inkpen & Eric W. K. Tsang, Social Capital,Networks, and Knowledge

Transfer, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 146, 154 (2005); J. Carlos Jarillo, On Strategic Networks, 9 STRATEGIC

MGMT. J. 31, 37 (1988).
116. See text accompanying notes 74-77.
117. See Wenpin Tsai & Sumatra Ghoshal, Social Structure of "Cooperation" Within a Multiunit
Organization: Coordination,Competition, and IntraorganizationalKnowledge Sharing, 13 ORG. SCI.

179 (2002).
118.

See Inkpen & Tsang, supra note 115, at 159.
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she was around for the mistakes in the first place. Moreover, maintaining
stability in teams allows coworkers to develop interpersonal relationships
and have the kind of repeated social exchanges that build trust.1 19
Because of the importance of trust within teams, companies design in
trust mechanisms. Managers schedule in-person meetings to both ensure
face-to-face relationship-building and to have some control over the flow of
information. 120 To build trust among team members and incent productivity,
corporations create internal awards to highlight successful employees.
Although competitions for awards can create intra-team competition,
having clear and transparent award criteria, honoring more than one worker
at a time, and rejecting zero-sum awards can increase trust within teams by
assuring other team members that a coworker will be able to pull her
weight. 2 '
Companies also embed non-disclosure and non-compete clauses into
employment contracts to support what Amy Edmondson calls the
"psychological safety" of trust within teams. 22 The enforceability
of
covenants not to compete vary from state to state. 123 But they can reassure
employees that it is difficult for their coworkers to steal a good idea shared
during a design meeting and engage in opportunistic behavior. Knowing
that everyone is subject to the same limitation, coworkers can feel free to
disclose new ways of solving problems without fear of losing a competitive
124
advantage in the marketplace.

119. See id. at 156; see also Kathleen Carley, OrganizationalLearning and Personnel Turnover,
3 ORG. SCI. 20, 22 (1992) (noting that memories of individuals on teams is essential for team and
organizational leaming).
120. See Poltrock et al., supra note 110, at 242.
121. See Inkpen & Tsang, supra note 115, at 158.
122. Edmondson, PsychologicalSafety and Learning Behavior, supra note 113, at 350. But see
THOMAS 0. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: How SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT
PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 111 (2008) (arguing that "companies can invoke confidentiality clauses in
employee contracts" to prevent current and former employees from revealing "secret research").
123. Different states approach covenants not to compete differently. In 2016, President Obama
issued an executive order that called for state legislatures to reform non-compete law. Exec. Order No.
13,725, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,417 (Apr. 15, 2016). A related "Call to Action" urged states to (1) ban
noncompete clauses for low-earning workers; (2) improve transparency and fairness; and (3) incentize
employers to write enforceable contracts. WHITE HOUSE, STATE CALL TO ACTION ON NON-COMPETE
AGREEMENTS,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/competition/
noncompetescalltoaction-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/PCM4-6W5J]. California generally rejects all non-compete
clauses. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (2017). So does Colorado. See COL. REV. STAT. § 8-2113(2) (2017). Illinois strictly applies a reasonableness requirement. See, e.g., Cambridge Eng'g, Inc. v.
Mercury Partners 90 BI, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 512 (Ill. 2007). Washington State is more permissive. See,
e.g., Perry v. Moran, 748 P.2d 224, 229 30 (Wash. 1987); Knight, Vale & Gregory v. McDaniel, 680
P.2d 448, 451-52 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). So is Massachusetts. See Marcam Corp. v. Orchard, 885 F.
Supp. 294, 299 (D. Mass. 1995).
124. See Inkpen & Tsang, supra note 115, at 158 (when members worry that they may be
competing against each other, suspicion replaces trust and knowledge sharing is sacrificed).
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The law outside the company serves the same function. Many state courts
are willing to enforce non-compete clauses and non-disclosure
agreements.' 2 5 The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) allows
employers to sue employees who "intentionally [access] a computer without
26
authorization or [exceed] authorized access" to steal company secrets.
And the law of trade secrecy prohibits employees from transferring
27
Trade
corporate proprietary information to gain an unfair advantage.
is
purposes
primary
its
of
one
respect:
this
in
utilitarian
secret law is overtly
workthe
doing
employees
their
extension,
by
to give companies-and,
the breathing space to innovate, create relationships, and share information
28
knowing that bad, opportunistic behavior will be punished. This breathing
space for innovation is another way of understanding the role of trust among
teams of coworkers, 29and it only survives because it is buttressed by design
and backed by law. 1

125. In addition to the cases cited in note 123, other cases show many states are willing to enforce
non-compete clauses. See, e.g., Vital Images, Inc. v. Martel, No. 07-4195, 2007 WL 3095378, at *3 (D.
Minn. Oct. 19, 2007); Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495, 501
n.6 (E.D. Ky. 1996); Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544, 547 (Ohio 1975); Allen v. Rose Park
Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 826 (Utah 1951).
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2008); see also United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir.
2010); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (1 Ith Cir. 2010); Int'l Airport Centers, LLC v.
Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir.
2001).
127. See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 67374 (1960); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 757, Comment b (2017).
128. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1974) (discussing the
purposes behind trade secret law); Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 434-35 (Pa. 1960) (focusing on
the importance of trade secrecy in research and development).
129. Undoubtedly, legal levers like covenants not to compete and trade secrecy can have negative
social effects-the former are often thrust upon employees in contexts of unequal bargaining power, and
companies use the latter to shield themselves from legal and public scrutiny. Rebecca Wexler, for
example, has shown that trade secrecy is used in the criminal justice system to hide the ways algorithms
decide the fate of some convicted of crimes. See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets:
Intellectual Property in the CriminalJustice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018) (showing how trade
secrecy is invoked in the criminal justice system). And according to Rachel Amow-Richman, unequal
bargaining positions make it "inappropriate to view noncompete terms as the product of reasoned
reflection or as dispositive of the parties' rights and obligations." Rachel S. Amow-Richman, Bargaining
for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of/the Role of Substantive Fairnessin Enforcing
Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1215 (2001). This is true even for employees with
particularly valuable skills: "[e]ven if a particular employee possesses valuable human capital that is in
demand in the relevant market,... there are [substantive and procedural] reasons to distrust the quality
of the bargain he or she reaches with the employer." Id. at 1214.
How, or whether, to deploy these tools are important sociolegal questions beyond the scope of this
paper. For now, it is sufficient to note that one of the goals of covenants not to compete and trade secrecy
is to create a zone of confidentiality around information sharing in the workplace. In that capacity, they
support organic and designed-in norms of trust in order to foster socially beneficial disclosure.
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C. Attorney-Client Relationships
The attorney-client relationship is, like AA meetings and corporate
teams, an overtly social environment where disclosure is both necessary and
socially beneficial. As such, disclosure is designed into the relationship
itself. The Supreme Court has recognized this, noting in UpJohn v. United
States130 that effective advocacy depends on the "lawyer's being fully
131
informed by the client."'
The Supreme Court also long ago acknowledged the salient role of trust
in the attorney-client relationship, noting in 1888 that a lawyer's "assistance
can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences
or the apprehension of disclosure."1 32 Therefore, trust norms compensate for
the vulnerability inherent in sharing personal information with an
attorney. 133 Just like in AA meetings and within teams, that trust begins
organically. We trust experts and other professionals based on their
degrees. 134 There is some evidence that we trust lawyers and doctors based
on firm or hospital affiliations, respectively, 3 5 and even office design.136
The transference process does not end there. Many of us do not choose
doctors and lawyers based solely on their degrees. Rather, we rely on the
recommendations of others and, in particular, those that we respect. 37
But because going to a good law school or even coming recommended
does not guarantee a lawyer will always act in her client's interests,"38 the
legal profession designs in its own rules that support the organic trust of an
attorney-client relationship. That private ordering comes from three
sources: the oath that every lawyer takes upon being sworn into the bar; 139

130.

449 U.S. 383 (1981).

131.
132.

Id. at 389.
Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888); see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.

40, 51 (1980).
133.
See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 146 (1986) (noting that trust is

important in attorney-client relationships to ensure full and frank disclosure).
134. Doney et al., supra note 56, at 603.
135.

Mark A. Hall et al., Trust in Physicians and Medical Institutions: What Is It, Can It Be

Measured,and Does It Matter?, 79 MILBANK Q. 613, 619-20 (2001).
136.

The Best Law Firm Offices in America: The Finalists!, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 30, 2012,

6:19 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/08/the-best-law-firm-offices-in-america-the-finalists/2 [https://
perma.cc/K2LB-3R 28].
137.

Rabin, supra note 57.

138. Acting in a client's interests is the sin qua non of fiduciary law. Fiduciaries are those that
have special obligations of loyalty to another. Those loyalties are based on trust: a trustor, client, or
beneficiary hands over money, control, and information to another, who, in turn, has a duty not to betray
that trust. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 106-08 (2011).

139.

The oath of admission for the United States federal courts, for example, is as follows: "I
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that as an attorney and as a counselor of this court I will
conduct myself uprightly and according to law, and that I will support the Constitution of the United
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the American Bar Association, which has developed Model Rules of
Professional Conduct;14 ° and bar association ethics opinions, which
interpret the rules and give lawyers guidance on particular ethical
dilemmas.'4 1 At the heart of these ethical codes and guidelines is
confidentiality.1 42 Together, these self-regulatory tools remind clients that
they can speak freely with their attorneys, share personal, even stigmatizing
information, trusting that their lawyer will keep their confidences.
That trust is also enforced by the courts and other legal levers. Ethics
1 43
rules are enforced by state disciplinary regimes. Courts also rely on codes
of professional ethics when poorly-served clients bring motions to
sue their
disqualify. 144 The law of professional malpractice allows clients1 to
45 And the
attorneys for, among other things, betraying their confidences.
attorney-client privilege protects communications between lawyers and
146
their clients in court. In Trammel v. United States, the Court stated that
the rationale for this, and the priest-penitent and doctor-patient, privileges
is explicitly based on trust:
These privileges are rooted in the imperative need for confidence and
trust. The priest-penitent privilege recognizes the human need to
disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence,
what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly
consolation and guidance in return. The lawyer-client privilege rests
on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to
the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional
mission is to be carried out. Similarly, the physician must know all
that a patient can articulate in order to identify and to treat disease;
States."

See

Attorney

Oath

of

Admission,

U.S.

COURTS,

53
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao 1 0.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3 SR-NUWM].

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016) [hereinafter MODEL
140.
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/publications/model-rules_
RULES],
of professional conduct/model rules of professional conduct table of contents/

[https://perma.cc/65FP-9CMU].
141. See Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More Effective Regulationof

Lawyers' Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 313 (2002) (discussing the role of ethics opinions).

142. See, e.g., MODEL RULES r. 1.6, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional
responsibility/publications/model rules of professionalconduct/rule 1 6 confidentialityof inform
ation/ [https://perma.cc/8TG3-KESK].
143. See Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1998) (noting that since the ABA's

Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement chastised lawyer discipline as
"scandalous," the role of the state in enforcing attorney ethical standard has increased).
144. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753
(1975) (starting with attorney ethics rules during a motion to disqualify).
145.

Benjamin

C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and the Structure of Negligence Law, 67

FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 662-82 (1998) (describing legal malpractice as a subset of negligence law and
identifying gaps in the model for tortious legal malpractice developed by William Prosser).
146. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
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barriers to full disclosure would impair diagnosis and treatment.147
Therefore, law, through the use of the courts as enforcement mechanisms
and the doctrines of malpractice and privilege, helps balance out the
powerful disclosure norms in attorney-client relationships with equally as
powerful norms of trust.
III. THE PROBLEM OF TECHNOSOCIAL SPACES
No social space is perfectly safe; there is no way to guard against all
opportunistic or malicious behavior. AA members are sometimes outed,
workers steal secrets, and lawyers betray confidences. But within those
social spaces, actors share with the expectation, designed in and backed by
law, that their information will be kept confidential. And society benefits as
a result. That's how it's supposed to work.
Technosocial spaces, or those in which technology mediates social
interaction, are different. Although they, like offline contexts, are
characterized by powerful pressures to disclose, their technical architecture,
internal rules, and the legal and regulatory environment in which they
operate do not support the kind of trust that protects users from harm. In
fact, they do the opposite. Technosocial platforms are designed to entice and
manipulate disclosure with false trust. And the law lets them do it. These
missing pieces make these spaces unsafe, and ripe for harassment and
invasions of privacy. This is evident from two case studies described below:
online social networks and interactions with social robots.
A. Disclosure and Other Risks
Disclosure is the lifeblood of technosocial spaces. Without sharing our
likes, opinions, and behaviors, technosocial platforms could not achieve
their goals of bringing people together. 48 Nor could they learn from us,
adapt to our needs, and provide the kinds of conveniences consumers seem
to want. And they certainly couldn't process, analyze, and sell our data for
profit. 149 Facebook needs our data to sell billions of dollars in targeted
advertising space. Artificial intelligence needs our data to learn. Dating apps
147. Id. at 51. The phrase "confidence and trust" as a basis for the privilege doctrine is repeated
in ninety-eight federal, state, and international cases citing Trammel.
148. Facebook's mantra is "bring the world closer together." See Josh Constine, Facebook
Changes Mission Statement to 'Bring the World Closer Together', TECHCRUNCH (June 26, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/ 2017/06/22/bring-the-world-closer-together/ [https://perma.cc/5ETB-PFH8].
149. See, e.g., Mark Hachman, The Price of Free: How Apple, Facebook, Microsoft and Google
Sell You to Advertisers, PCWORLD (Oct. 1, 2015, 3:00 AM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/2986988/

privacy/the-price-of-free-how-apple-facebook-microsoft-and-google-sell-you-to-advertisers.html
://perma.cc/4LBX-K7D8].

[https
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need our data to match us to others. Disclosure is a necessary part of
technosocial spaces.
This poses risks to our safety. Twitter has a long history of tolerating
hate and harassment on its platform, contributing to the silencing of women
150
and users from other marginalized communities. Some dating apps and
websites do little even when they know their platforms are rife with racism,
51
homophobia, and harassment.1 And some websites invite their users to
15 2
post images of nonconsensual pornography. Our privacy is also in danger.
Facebook's has for years taken a cavalier approach to third-party access to
user data, giving companies we don't know access to our personal
platforms, mines
information. 153 Google, like a myriad of other digital
154maeu
made us
Snapchat
targeting.
behavioral
for
data
personal
of
terabytes
we sent
videos
and
photos
the
of
lives
shelf
the
over
think we had control
155 The list goes on.
different.
far
to other users, but the reality was
157
Social robots, 156 like PARO, the therapeutic baby seal, or Sony's Aibo

dog. 158 They pose some similar and some unique dangers by virtue of their
and learning. 159
social abilities, including communication, cooperation,
Social robots are machines that collect vast amounts of data behind a veil of
0
human-like social features. 16 They can also perpetuate intimate partner
150. See, e.g., Monique Judge, Twitter Has a Serious HarassmentandAbuse Problembut Doesn 't
Seem to Want to Cure It, ROOT (Oct. 30, 2017, 4:59 PM), https://www.theroot.com/twitter-has-a[https://perma.cc/D65X-F96A]; see also
serious-harassment-and-abuse-problem-but-1819979725
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 3.
151. See, e.g., Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); see also Waldman,
Law, Privacy, and Online Dating,supra note 6 (discussing the experience of some users who report
notifying platforms of terms of service violations, but never receiving responses or remediation).
152. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 343 (2014).
a
153. See, e.g., Alvin Chang, The Facebook and Cambridge Analytica Scandal, Explained8 with
3 23
Simple Diagram, VOx (May 2, 2018, 3:25 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/201 / / /
17151916/facebook-cambridge-analytica-trump-diagram [https://perma.cc/7S42-T2QH].
154. See Steven Melendez, How Google is Breaking EU Privacy Law, According to a New
Complaint, FAST COMPANY (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90236273/google-facesgdpr-privacy-complai nt-over-its-targeted-ads-from-brave-browser [https://penna.cc/6JU3-2YGK].
155. Complaint, Snapchat, Inc., 79 Fed. Reg. 27611 (F.T.C. May 8, 2014) (FTC File No. 132
3078), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140508snapchatcmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5CFF-YWC9] [hereinafter Snapchat Complaint].
156. See Kate Darling, Extending Legal Protection to Social Robots, in ROBOT LAW 214 (Ryan
Cale, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016) (defining social robots as physically embodied agents
that interact with and learn from humans on a social level).
http://www.parorobots.com/
PARO,
Robot,
Therapeutic
PARO
See
157.
[https://perma.cc/KU5K-USZH].
158. See AIBO, https://us.aibo.com/ [https://perma.cc/KKN8-VMJL].
Cynthia Breazeal, Toward Sociable Robots, 42 ROBOTICS & AUTONOMOUS SYS. 167, 168
159.
(2003).
See M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and Technology
160.
Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 809, 817-25 (2010) [hereinafter Cale, People Can Be So Fake]
(discussing how cyberlaw has traditionally focused on data collection as the salient privacy problem
posed by robotics); Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785, 797-801
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surveillance,' 61 suffocate autonomy, 162 and eliminate opportunities for
solitude. 163 They can spy on us and nudge us to buy things. 164 And our

connections to social robots can be leveraged to manipulate us into paying
for high-priced upgrades or responding to advertisements snuck into
165
answers and responses.

As Ryan Calo has argued, social robots have three essential qualities that
help us understand the risks they pose to our privacy: embodiment,
emergence, and social valence. Social robots are embodied in that they

occupy physical form. They may be programmed to act based on a coded
series of ones and zeros, but we phenomenologically experience social
robots taking physical action in the physical world. 166 Robots are also
emergent in that they (and their programming) can learn and adapt to new
circumstances and new demands.1 67 To us, then, social robots are part of an
ongoing social dance of back-and-forth interaction much like humans. 168
And they have a social valence in that and we tend to use social models to
understand them. 1 69 This is why we tend to become uncomfortable with and
resistant to behaviors that would "harm" robots; 170 their shape, verbal skills,

(2015) [hereinafter Hartzog, Unfair andDeceptive Robots] (discussing all the ways robots can spy on
their human users).
161.
See Freed et al., supra note 7.
162. See Cato, People Can Be So Fake, supra note 160, at 847; see also M. Ryan Cato, Robots
and Privacy, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTS 187, 195 (Patrick
Lin et al. eds., 2012); M. Ryan Cato, The Drone As Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29
(2011) (backlash around robots bound up with cultural depictions of robots); M. Ryan Cato, Against
Notice Skepticism in Privacy (andElsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012) [hereinafter Cato,
Against Notice Skepticism] (robotic surveillance introduces cues of surveillance that are actually missing
in computer-mediated cyberspace).
163. See Cato, People Can Be So Fake, supra note 160, at 843-46.
164. See Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, supra note 160, at 797-802.
165. See Darling, supra note 156, at 221.
166. See Ryan Cato, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 532-37
(2015) [hereinafter Cato, Cyberlaw]. Phenomenologists argue that the only way to understand the world
around us is to start from the point of human embodied perception and experience, rather than from an
ontological perspective. See MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION xi-xii
(Ted Honderich ed., Colin Smith trans., 1962) ("The world is not an object such that I have in my
possession the law of its making; it is the natural setting of, and field for, all my thoughts and all my
explicit perceptions."). Mark Coeckelbergh has taken a phenomenological approach to robots, arguing
that ethics for robotics should start at the point of human perception rather than technical definitions of
robots. See, e.g., Mark Coeckelbergh, Robot Rights? Towards a Social-Relational Justificationfor
Moral Consideration,12 ETHICS & INFO TECH. 209 (2010); Mark Coeckelbergh, Humans, Animals, and
Robots: A PhenomenologicalApproach to Human-Robot Relations, 3 INT'L J. OF SOC. ROBOTICS 197
(2010); Mark Coeckelbergh, Virtual MoralAgency, Virtual MoralResponsibility, 24 Al & SOCIETY 181
(2009).
167. See Cato, Cyberlaw, supra note 166, at 539.
168. See GOFFMAN, EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 11, at 62-63.
169. See Cato, Cyberlaw, supra note 166, at 545-46.
170. See, e.g., Peter H. Kahn, Jr. et al., The New Ontological Category Hypothesis in HumanRobot Interaction,2001 6TH INT'L CONF. ON HUMAN-ROBOT INTERACTIONS 159 (2001).
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distinguish them from
adaptability, and seemingly autonomous actions
171
minds.
our
in
tools
and
machines, appliances,
For these reasons, social robots create social spaces that put our privacy
at risk. We interact with social robots in ways similar to interacting with
humans because regardless of our intellectual ability to recognize that robots
aren't human, robots with human qualities feel social to us. This isn't
accidental. Social robots are specifically designed to trigger our
172
and to induce the kind of trust we
predisposition to anthropomorphize,
usually reserve for other humans. This lulls us into a false sense of security,
thus increasing our propensity to disclose personal information to a datahungry corporation hiding behind a social veil. Woodrow Hartzog has
73
called this "the most fundamental reason we are vulnerable to robots.
These problems exist in part because online social networks and social
robots are built to encourage disclosure. But instead of supporting
disclosure and user safety with trust-building design, technosocial spaces
leverage design to cue false trust among their members, putting up a veneer
in front of massive, invasive data collection and sharing with third parties.
And the law lets them do it. Therefore, online social networks and social
robots create unsafe social spaces.
B. Organic Trust in TechnosocialSpaces
All of the social forces that naturally generate trust among individuals
offline are present in technosocial spaces. Our propensity to disclose
information on online social networks is positively correlated with the
number of friends-and even more so with the number of close friendswe have on the platform. 174 In one study, eighty-five percent of users said
would accept a Facebook "friend" request from a stranger if they shared a
sufficient number of mutual friends and eighty-one percent would do the
75
The vast majority
same if the stranger was friends with their close friends.
request from a
friend
a
accept
would
LGBTQ
as
of users who identify
176
and bisexual
gay
and
queer
as
stranger simply because they also identified
of the
because
apps
men tend to trust strangers on queer-only dating

171. Don Ihde has argued that robots' meaning in society is "multistable": we may sometimes see
robots as machines and sometimes see them as more than machines. See DON IHDE, TECHNOLOGY AND

THE L1FEWORLD (1990).
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Darling, supra note 156, at 214.
Hartzog, Unfair andDeceptive Robots, supra note 160, at 791.
See Waldman, Privacy, Sharing,and Trust, supra note 6 1, at 21 6-17.
Id. at219.
Id. at 219 220.
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platform's inherent queerness, 77 thus lending credibility to the theory that
sharing an out-group identity can build trust.
Users also build trust through experience, over time, and via interaction.
Dating app users tend to share images of themselves after "chatting with the
other person" for a time, ranging from a few hours to a few weeks.
Reciprocity also inspires trust and, thereby, sharing of personal information.
Queer users of online social networks believe strongly in reciprocal sharing
because the mutual surveillance it allows can inspire trust and thus mitigate
the risks inherent in sharing nude or seminude images.17 8
Trust generation is even more organic in social spaces involving social
robots. We have an innate, evolutionary need to connect with others, 179 and
we naturally apply social models to understand and interact with the world
around us.1 80 One of those social models is anthropomorphization, or
ascribing human characteristics to nonhuman things, like when we talk to
our dogs or stuffed animals or when Tom Hanks paints a face on a volleyball
in CastAway.' 8
Our natural, "inborn" tendency to connect with social robots1 82 grows
stronger as objects take on more humanlike characteristics. Hanks painted
a face on his volleyball, which only then could be perceived as a head. Many
people put eyes on their Roombas,' 83 and two-thirds of Roomba owners give
them names.' 84 Human users bonded with ELIZA, a computer
psychoanalysis program that asked users questions like a therapist and filled
in conversations with dummy placeholder comments, prompting the lead
experimenter to issue a warning call about the manipulative effects of
artificial intelligence. 185 And another study showed that humans will engage
happily and politely with kind and polite computer programs. 18 6
Since social robots have more humanish qualities than Roombas or
desktop computers, the trust that develops between humans and social
robots is likely even more powerful than the trust developed in these
177.

See Waldman, Law, Privacy, and Online Dating,supra note 6.

178.

Id.

179. There is a long literature on this going back decades. See, e.g., Roy F. Baumeister & Mark
R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human
Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497 (1995); Abraham H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50
PSYCHOL. REv. 370 (1943).
180. See MERLEAU-PONTY, supra note 166.
181. CAST AWAY (20th Century Fox 2000).
182. See Calo, People Can Be So Fake, supra note 160, at 811, 826.
183. This practice has reached popular culture. See American Dad!: May the Best Stan Win (Fox

television broadcast Feb. 14, 2010).
184. See Robert Boyd, Robots are Narrowing the Gap With Humans, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS
(Apr. 27, 2009), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/article24534961 .html [https:
/perma.cc/PN3K-4G64].
185.
Calo, People Can Be So Fake, supra note 160, at 836.
186. Id. at 837.
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experiments. Sherry Turkle has shown that people of all ages establish tight
bonds with social robots. After playing with a humanish robot that could
make eye contact, follow a child around, and imitate the child's movements,
an eleven-year-old called her social robot "something that's part of you,..
'1 87
A seventy• something you love, kind of like another person, like a baby."
also noted
bear
koala
a
like
looked
that
robot
furry
a
of
user
one-year-old
years of
after
love
in
I
fell
eyes,
brown
large,
his
into
that "[w]hen I looked
little
the
for
care
and
protect
to
swore
being quite lonely . . . [and] I
88
dilemma
prisoner
playing
Other studies have shown that people
animal."
games with technological interfaces tended to keep their promises with
89
There are a growing number of persuasive
more humanish partners.'
1 90
it to say, as Karl MacDorman and Hiroshi
Suffice
these.
like
just
studies
and behavior.., elicit the sorts of
appearance
Ishiguro note, "[h]uman-like
one another."' 9 1 And the more
toward
direct
responses that people typically
humanish they get, "the more human-directed . . . expectations are
elicited."' 192 Central to those expectations is trust.
C. ManipulativeDesigns that Entice Disclosure
Rather than using design to counterbalance powerful norms of disclosure
to support organic trust, technosocial spaces leverage design to elicit more
disclosure by creating a veneer of false trust where actually none exists.
93
There are many examples of this,' but the designs of Snapchat, Facebook
News Feeds, and embodied social robots are paradigmatic.
Snapchat was originally designed to manipulate disclosure by creating
the appearance of trust. It sold itself as a privacy-protective platform by
highlighting a design choice that made any image or video, or "snap," sent

187.

Sherry Turkle, In Good Company? On the Threshold of Robotic Companions, in CLOSE

AND DESIGN
ENGAGEMENTS WITH ARTIFICIAL COMPANIONS: KEY SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, ETHICAL,

ISSUES 3 (Yorick Wilks ed., 2010).
188. Id. at5.
189. Salvatore Parise et al., Cooperatingwith Life-Like Interface Agents, 15 COMPUTS. IN HUM.
BEHAV. 123, 124 (1999).
For an in-depth discussion of many of the field experiments on human-computer and human190.
robot interaction, see Calo, People Can Be So Fake, supra note 160, at 840.
Karl F. MacDorman & Hiroshi Ishiguro, The Uncanny Advantage of Using Androids in
191.
Cognitive and Social Science Research, 7 INTERACTION STUD. 297, 316 (2006).
192. Id. at309.
193. Woodrow Hartzog collects and reports on a plethora of examples in HARTZOG, PRIVACY'S
BLUEPRINT, supra note 21, at 197-275. There is also a growing research agenda on the impact of"dark
patterns" on disclosure online. Dark patterns are "user interface design choices that benefit an online
service by coercing, steering, or deceiving users into making unintended and potentially harmful
decisions." Arunesh Mathur, Dark Patternsat Scale: Findingsfrom a Crawl of I1K Shopping Websites,
ACM CSCW, 2019, at 1, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.07032.pdf [https://perma.cc/U93F-S37P]; see also
Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014) (arguing, in relevant part,
that consumer protection law must adapt to address the market manipulations of dark patterns).
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across its platform would automatically disappear after several seconds and
could not be retained by users. Except, it was not originally designed that
way. Before sending a snap, users were shown a screen that required them
to designate the amount of time the snap will survive before disappearing,
thus building expectations of confidentiality and discretion and a sense of
user control. 194 Snaps could not be sent without selecting an option. In
reality, there were several ways snaps sent could be saved, downloaded, or
copied. 195 This gave users the false impression, reinforced in the platform's
product descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions,' 96 that they actually
had control over what their recipients could do with their snaps.
There was no trust designed into Snapchat. Until October 2013, it stored
all videos in unprotected spaces on users' phones, which allowed recipients
to simply search for and download a video they wanted to save. 97 Snapchat
also allowed any third-party application to access its application
programming interface and download or copy videos and images.' 98 Not
only were these vulnerabilities not conveyed to users, but the platform's
design created contrary expectations.
Facebook designs its interface to deliver cues of trust to its members so
they will share more personal information: it creates a sense of community
through rich profiles, privileges our friends' posts so we see them first, and
publicly informs us of our friends' online behavior to encourage reciprocal
sharing.' 99 Facebook's News Feed, the running list of stories and posts from
our friends, is designed to make it difficult for users to distinguish between
social posts and native advertisements. Among other design tactics, both
types of posts are prefaced by notices about our friends' interactions"Jane, Joe, and 18 others liked this"-and both are followed by notifications
of our friends' comments-"David, Maggy, and 27 others commented on
this post." This design cues trust: users can look to Jane, Joe, David, and
Maggy and feel confident that the post is social, meaningful, and relevant.
But when the same trust cues appear on an advertisement, on a link to a third
194. Snapchat Complaint, supra note 155, at 6.
195. Id. at n 9-17. Much of the FTC's case against Snapchat focused on the company's failure
to disclose certain data collection practices in its privacy statement. See id. 8-33. But broken promises
litigation is just one part of the FTC's privacy jurisprudence. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog,
The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 667 (2014). As Solove &

Hartzog point out, the FTC has developed a broader view of unfair or deceptive practices, including, for
example, "deception by omission," id. at 631, "inducement" to share personal information, id. at 63233, and "pretexting," id. at 633, to namejust a few. Their persuasive argument is that "through a common
law-like process, the FTC's actions have developed into a rich jurisprudence that is effectively the law
of the land for businesses that deal in personal information." Id. at 589.
196. Snapchat Complaint, supra note 155, at
7-8.
197. Id. at 10.
198. Id. at 11.
199. See Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust, supra note 61, at 221-23.
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party whose data collection practices are unknown, or, worse yet, on click
°
bait to a radically invasive quiz or website," the design transfers the trust
we have in our friends to a third-party advertiser about which we know little.
These design tactics hide privacy risks from users, cuing trust where no
protections for users actually exist.
Social robots also use design to cue false trust. By creating machines that
mimic human behavior while looking like adorable baby seals or having
other anthropomorphic characteristics, social robots lull us into a false sense
of trust. And they tend to manipulate the most vulnerable among us: the
°1
elderly, the disabled, and the lonely. Advanced social robots use sounds,
language, and movement in ways reminiscent of, if not identical to, humans.
As such, social robots have the capacity to appear trustworthy; they can be
partners in ongoing social interaction. For Erving Goffnan, social
interaction is an ongoing dance, with both leaders and followers sharing
responsibility for continuing the dance: individuals determine what they
want to reveal and their partners (Goffrnan calls them the "audience") keep
2
Social robots
up the charade of persona management by playing along.
play along, as well. They generally behave in expected ways: Alexa answers
questions, 20 3 Roombas skate along the floor, robot butlers get coffee. We
are meant to experience them phenomenologically and, therefore, see the
designed-in humanish qualities rather than the technology company lurking
behind the curtain.
They are, then, classic "Wizard of Oz" setups with unique abilities to
users
harm. 4 As Jacqueline Kory Westlund and Cynthia Breazeal note,
"may not realiz[e] that a human is hearing everything they say., 20 5 "Given
that social robots are designed to draw us in, often engaging us emotionally
and building relationships with us, the robot itself could be deceptive in that
200. See, e.g., Think Before You Click: How Facebook ClickbaitPuts Users at Risk, WRAL.cOM
(May 10, 2016), http://www.wral.com/think-before-you-click-how-facebook-clickbait-puts-users-at-ri
sk-/15682285/ [https://perma.cc/4SSC-QJAL]; Claire Suddath, The Weather Channel's Secret: Less
AM),
5:00
2014,
9,
(Oct.
BLOOMBERG
Clickbait,
More
Weather,
2
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 014-10-09/weather-channels-web-mobile-growth-leadsto-advertising-insights [https://perma.cc/B9KU-DVTU].
See James A. Mourey et al., Products as Pals: Engaging with Anthropomorphic Products
201.
Mitigates the Effects of Social Exclusion, 44 J. CONSUMER RES. 414 (2017) (finding that social robots
tend to elicit the greatest response from people who are lonely or recently suffered loss).
202. GOFFMAN, EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 11, at 9.
203. Alexa does not normally laugh fiendishly at 10:00 P.M., and the fact that it behaved out of
the ordinary is what struck many users as problematic when it did laugh. See Brian Koerber, Amazon
Reveals Why Alexa is Randomly Laughing and Creeping People Out, MASHABLE (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://mashable.com/2018/03/07/wh y-amazon-alexa-laughing/ [https://perma.cc/Z28J-7U2U].
204. See Hartzog, Unfair andDeceptive Robots, supra note 160, at 804-05.
205. Jacqueline Kory Westlund & Cynthia Breazeal, Deception, Secrets, Children, and Robots:
What's Acceptable?, 10TH ACM/IEEE CONFERENCE ON HUMAN-ROBOT INTERACTION, 2015, at 1,

www.openroboethics.org/hri I5/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Mf-Westlund.pdf [https://perma.cc/KTR7
-LU56].
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it appears to" make a connection, "but 'in reality,"' it's just gathering data
on us. 2 06 Ian Kerr presciently recognized this over a decade ago: "Like
Hollywood's finest directors, who are able to steer their audiences' attention
away from the false assumptions that they have so skillfully engendered,
some software programmers are applying principles of cognitive science to
develop electronic entities that garner consumer trust. Unfortunately, some
e-businesses are exploiting these applications to garner trust where no such
20 7

trust is warranted.,

D. Legal and Regulatory Void
Technology companies that design technosocial platforms are allowed to
leverage design in manipulative ways because, for the most part, the law
allows it. Legal regimes like malpractice law, tort law, trademark law, and
private ordering schemes like professional licensing requirements constrain
the opportunistic behavior of information trustees in the offline context.2 °8
Digital spaces do not just lack comparable legal levers. The laws that do
exist actively promote insecurity and risk to users.
Online social networks have no legal incentive to police their platforms
for hate and harassment because Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act immunizes them for most third party conduct on their
platforms.20 9 Section 230 was passed in reaction to a lawsuit against
Prodigy, one of the original online service providers. 210 At the time, Prodigy
filtered profanity and other harmful content out of its platform, holding itself
out as a family-friendly technosocial space. 21 1 After a user posted
defamatory comments about a securities company, the firm sued Prodigy,
arguing that Prodigy should be liable as publisher of the defamation.21 2 The
New York Supreme Court agreed.2 13
Section 230 was then introduced in Congress by then-Representative
Christopher Cox of California and now-Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon to
overturn the Prodigy case and to protect internet service providers from
lawsuits focusing on imperfect filtering.2 14 Congress stated that it passed the
206.
207.

Id.
Ian R. Kerr, Bots, Babes, and the Californicationof Commerce, 1 U. OTrAWA L. & TECH. J.
285, 288 (2004).
208. Seesupra Part II.
209. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
210. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs., Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
211. Id. at *2.
212. Id. at* 1-2.
213.
See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad
Samaritans§ 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REv. 401,405 (2017).
214. See 141 CONG. REC. H8460-01 (Aug. 4, 1995).
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law to preserve the internet as "a forum for a true diversity" of views "with
a minimum of government regulation," and to maintain "the vibrant and
exists for the Internet ...unfettered
competitive free market that presently
215
by Federal or State regulation.

Congress's other reason for enacting Section 230 was to encourage
Internet intermediaries, users, and parents to self-police the Internet for
obscene conduct.21 6 But in interpreting the clause, federal courts cemented
broad immunity for platforms, leaving no legal incentive to police bad
2 t7
behavior. In Zeran v. America Online, for example, the Fourth Circuit
risk
noted that lawsuits against providers for third-party content would
2 18 In a an
"freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium."
expansive, maximalist holding, the court stated that "Section 230 was
enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication,
and accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a
minimum.' '219 This and other broad immunity decisions created an online
world where platforms have no legal incentive to make their platforms safe
and where perpetrators do not fear the consequences of their actions.
Nor does current law encourage online social networks or the designers
of social robots to protect user privacy. Although new privacy laws like
220
Europe's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and California's
22 1
and the renewed prospect for comprehensive
Consumer Privacy Act,
22 2
privacy legislation in the United States, offer the promise of reasonable
constraints on predatory data collectors, United States consumers are still
operating under a notice-and-choice regime that carries with it minimal
223 Notice-and-choice requires
obligations for technology companies.
215. 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a)(3)-(4), (b)(2).
216. See § 230(b)(4); 141 CONG. REC. H8469-70 (Aug. 4, 1995) (statements of Reps. Cox, Wyden
the
and Barton); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998). This is sometimes called
to
"Good Samaritan" clause. Kate Klonick argues that social media platforms have economic incentives
take this to heart when it comes to harassing, hateful, and harmful speech. See Klonick, supra note 10,
at 1627-30.
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
217.
218. Id. at 330.
219. Id. at 330; see also Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n.3
(10th Cir. 2000) (similar).
220. See Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter GDPR].
221. See Assem. B. 375, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
222. Senator Brian Schatz (D-H) has introduced a draft bill of federal privacy legislation. Data
4
Care Act, S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 15th-congress/senate-bill/374
a
federal
with
CCPA
the
[https://perma.cc/4PWJ-B4RV]. Technology companies are hoping to pre-empt
law written with their input. See Cecilia Kang, Tech Industry Pursues a FederalPrivacy Law - On its
Own Terms, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.nytim es.com/2018/08/26/technology/techindustry-fed eral-privacy-law.html [https://perma.cc/65RV-B22G].
223. That is, unless those companies fall within one of the few industries regulated by sectorspecific privacy laws, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) or
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, which regulates financial information. See Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended at 42
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companies that collect our data to describe their data collection tactics and
data use practices, and to give us the opportunity to opt out. 224 Privacy
policies are, therefore, its primary legal tool. As a doctrine of informed
consent, 225 notice-and-choice is supposed to give us control over our data
by giving us the information we need to make rational disclosure decisions.
But the regime is inadequate. Not only are privacy policies
incomprehensible, 226 but the entire endeavor of notice-and-choice is
premised on the myth of an autonomous user.2 27 We do not make perfectly
rational disclosure decisions, and we wouldn't even if we could comprehend
privacy policies. 228 Far from providing any real notice, the consent model
employed today actually disempowers users by putting them in a position
in which their consent-"Click 'I agree' to continue"-is used as an excuse
to allow companies to use data how they see fit. Consent, then, extracts
power that should belong to users.2 29
And the prospect of change under the GDPR is slim. Some scholars have
argued that the GDPR is little more than the old notice-and-choice regime

U.S.C. §§ 1320d(1)-(9)); 45 C.F.R. § 164.528 (2016); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), Financial
Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809). But even those laws are incomplete. HIPAA only protects certain health data
held by certain covered entities, like health insurance plans, clearinghouses, HMOs, and company health
plans. And it only applies to doctors if they electronically transfer information in connection with a
transaction for which the Department of Health and Human Services has adopted a standard. See 45
C.F.R. §§ 160.102 160.103; see also CoveredEntitiesand Business Associates, HHS.Gov, http://www.
hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/covered-entities/ [https://perma.cc/2UG7-NWPB]. And the GLBA only
applies to companies that offer consumer financial products or services to explain their informationsharing practices. It does not cover the entire financial services industry. See 113 Stat. at 1443-45
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6809 (2000)).
224. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 195, at 592.
225. See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., PrivacyHarms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice
Framework, 11I/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'y 485, 518 (2015). The principle of informed consent,
as in the analogous contexts of medical procedures and scientific research, flows directly from Kant's
categorical imperative: "Act in such a way as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that
of anyone else, always as an end and never merely as a means." IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR
THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 29 (2005); see also Jorge L. Contreras, Genetic Property, 105 GEO. L.J.
1, 18 (2016).
226. See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., DisagreeablePrivacy Policies:Mismatches Between Meaning
and Users' Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 40, 87-88 (2015) (presenting results of an
experimental study showing that average internet users do not understand privacy policies and that even
experts cannot agree on the meanings of certain terms).
227. See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE
PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 16-21 (2012) (as part of the governing principles ofcyberspace); Cohen,
DRM and Privacy, supra note 19, at 225 27 (users are constrained by the built online environments
around them); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 25-28 (1996) (as the foundation of political philosophy).
228. Acquisti, John & Loewenstein, supranote 61, at 160.
229. See HARTZOG, PRIVACY'S BLUEPRINT, supra note 21, at 207 211 (discussing the problem
of "extracted consent").
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23 ° Some of its language is impossibly
with a few new bells and whistles.
23 1
vague and of little help in supporting and fostering safe sharing online.
Social robots exist in a similar regulatory void. Their data use practices,
at least in the United States, are governed by a notice-and-choice regime,
and they don't even have webpage interfaces on which one can find a
privacy policy. And, although the FTC has the power to regulate the
2 32
manipulative design strategies of social robots, it has yet to exercise that
233
authority in any significant way. That could be because social robots are
so new. It could also be because the FTC continues to defer to a selfregulation privacy regime, which gives technology companies the power to
set the terms of industry practice.

IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO DESIGN AND LAW

So far, I have argued that law and design must work together to buttress
trust norms that protect socially beneficial disclosures. I have also shown
that current law and design thinking do the opposite when it comes to
technosocial spaces. They are leveraged to promote disclosures that benefit
technology companies, but put users at risk. We can change that. We need
to design our technosocial spaces to build trust endogenously, and we need
law to both incent technology companies to design for privacy and safety
and protect users when something goes wrong.
A. Designingfor Trust and Safety
Technosocial spaces can be designed to enhance trust, protect our
privacy, and keep us safe. As noted earlier, "design" refers to the set of
23 4
processes throughout which new technologies are built and come about.
As such, both technical specifications and corporate practices matter.
230. See Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable FairInformation Practices,76 MD. L.
REV. 952, 955-56 (2017) (calling the GDPR a "FIPs-based lawf").
231. See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 189, 195 (2019) (arguing that GDPR lays out several "broad standards" that need to be given
"specific substance over time"); Waldman, Privacy's Law of Design, supra note 26, at 1255-56
(examining the ambiguities in GDPR Article 25); Alison Cool, Europe'sData ProtectionLaw Is a Big,
Confusing Mess, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/opinion/gdpr(calling the GDPR "staggeringly
[https://perma.cc/DNM3-XLNN]
europe-data-protection.html
complex" and "intentionally ambiguous").
232. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) ("Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful."). The FTC
was given the authority to prevent such practices in subsection (a)(2). See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
233. But see Hartzog, Unfair andDeceptive Robots, supra note 160, at 812-21 (arguing that the
FTC both has the power and the capacity to address deceptive robots); see also HARTZOG, PRIVACY'S
BLUEPRINT, supra note 21, at 131-34 (calling on the FTC to take more aggressive steps to regulate
deceptive design, generally).
234. See HARTZOG, PRIVACY'S BLUEPRINT, supra note 21, at It.
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On the technology side, online social networks can change defaults to
better protect our privacy. On Venmo, a social network for online
transactions, interactions are public by default "because it's fun" to see what
our friends are buying, the company says.235 Corporate perceptions of user
entertainment aside, this choice only makes sense in a world where privacy
gets short shrift in design. Settings should default to privacy-protective
options, giving users the power to determine for themselves what
information they will share, when they share it, and with whom. This is one
of the principles behind privacy by design.
Although I am skeptical that a notice-and-choice regime could ever do
much good, notice can be improved. Warnings about privacy risks could
reach users on a visceral or emotional level rather than merely through
incomprehensible privacy policies.2 36 This would be especially useful in
technosocial spaces involving social robots, where websites are absent. On
social networks, sponsored posts on Facebook could use distinguishing
colors and presentation to separate them from social posts from our
friends. 237 So-called "just in time" notifications, or popups that inform users
of data collection as it happens, could help users make better, in-themoment decisions.2 3 8 And social websites could be redesigned to require
users to opt-in to data collection, as required in some circumstances by the
GDPR.239 Remaining opt-out tools that protect users from behavioral
tracking and cookies could be built in to browsers, obviating the need to
2 40
opt-out of data collection every time we visit a website
Safety by design could involve ephemeral messaging for intimate
images, access restrictions, streamlined takedown procedures, and
frictionless tagging of profiles that spew hate, engage in harassment, and
violate other terms of use. 24 1 For example, the queer-oriented dating app
Scruff allows users to easily tag profiles that are racist, hateful, and
235. Marrian Zhou, Venmo Transactions Are Public By Default as Part of It's Social Strategy,
CNET (July 20, 2018, 2:22 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/venmo-explains-why-transactions-arepublic-by-default/ [https: //perma.cc/79N9-NG5W].
236. See Cabo,Against Notice Skepticism, supra note 162, at 1030 (calling for the use of "visceral"
notice to enhance user understanding of privacy risks).
237. See Waldman, Privacy, Sharing,and Trust, supra note 61, at 226.
238. Id. at 226-27.
239. See, e.g., Guidelines on Consent Under Regulation 2016/679, at 12, 16 (Nov. 28, 2017),
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource-center/20180416_Article29WPGuidelinesonConsent
publishpdf.pdf [https: //perma.cc/T9QP-ZXHY].
240. See Commission Proposalfor a Regulation 201710003 of the European Parliamentand of
the Council Concerning the Respectfor Private Life and the Protection of PersonalData in Electronic
CommunicationsandRepealing Directive 2002/58/EC, COM (2017) 10 final (Oct. 1,2017), https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017PC00 I &from=EN
[https://perma.cc/YZ5R-JQBS].
241.
See HARTZOG, PRIVACY'S BLUEPRINT, supra note 21, at 228-29; see also Waldman, Law,
Privacy, and Online Dating,supra note 6.
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harassing. Reporting procedures are in-app, meaning users do not have to
click through to a second or third webpage to find a reporting form. The
information necessary is also limited: the flag and a brief explanation of the
incident or pattern of behavior are sufficient to initiate Scruff s forty-eighthour window for responding to all flags and harassment claims. That
frictionless reporting regime may be at least part of the reason why Scruff
242
and revenge pornography.
has few, if any, problems with racist profiles
Designing for trust also requires broad corporate commitments that reach
into the daily work of privacy and safety. Elsewhere, I have argued that
robust visions of privacy may not make their way into technology product
design because some designers-the engineers on the ground-do not share
24 3 Nor do they have the educational and
a commitment to privacy.
244
conceptual tools to spot ambiguous privacy issues raised by code.
Technology companies can address part of this problem endogenously by
integrating privacy and law into the design process. Companies should
include lawyers, sociologists, and other social scientists in design meetings.
At a minimum, these experts could be co-located with engineering teams.
And privacy should be included in corporate missions and designer training,
reinforced throughout their term of employment. In short, privacy has to be
24 5
part of both the ethos and routine of designers and their employers.
policies
Social platforms can also reorient their content moderation
th
246
and the
privacy,
sexual
populations,
toward protecting marginalized
safety of their users. Content moderation is a mixture of technology design
247
deployed to create
(artificial intelligence) and human capital resources
24 8
Kate Klonick has argued that
social environments for their users.
platforms try to moderate content to match the expectations of their users,
249
which include protections for free speech as well as online safety. But
much of that work is influenced by traditional First Amendment doctrine:
the people who conceptualized social media's place in the speech
governance ecosystem and developed moderation policies were lawyers
steeped in First Amendment law they had learned in school and practiced in

242.
243.

See Waldman, Law, Privacy,and Online Dating, supra note 6, at 16-17.
See Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55 HOUSTON L. REV. 659, 662-63

(2018).
244. See id. at 716-25.
245. See Martha S. Feldman & Brian T. Pentland, Reconceptualizing OrganizationalRoutines as
a Source of Flexibility and Change, 48 ADMIN SC. Q. 94, 94-95 (2003) (identifying that corporate
executives are responsible for the "ostensive" aspect of work, including setting the mission, and workers
on the ground "perform" the routine of work, translating that mission into actions and products); see
also Bruno Latour, The Powers of Association, 32 Soc. REV. 264, 266-68, 271-73 (1984).
246. See Citron, Sexual Privacy,supra note 18.
247. See Klonick, supra note 10, at 1635-47.

248.

Id. at 1602.

249.

Id.at 1627 28.
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the courtroom.2 50 It should come as no surprise that content moderation
started from a "baseline" of liberal free speech norms.25 1 Moderation
policies could instead be designed to tip the scales in favor of safety rather
than unfettered speech. Because the underlying policies still remain the
same, recent steps to ban right-wing hate are welcome, yet woefully
insufficient steps in this regard.252
B. Law to Support Trust and Safety
Technology companies need legal incentives to design for real trust and
safety, especially where such design may complicate data collection in an
economy dependent upon it. 253 That may be a heavy lift, but reasonable
changes are necessary to protect users. This section describes four legal
levers we can push: fiduciary law, FTC enforcement, privacy by design, and
reform to Section 230.
1. Information Fiduciaries
If we want technosocial spaces to inspire trust and foster safe and socially
beneficial disclosure in ways similar to AA meetings, teams of coworkers,
and attorney-client relationships, then we should treat technology platforms
as information fiduciaries. 254 Fiduciaries have special obligations of loyalty
because we put our trust in them. Estate managers, investment advisers,
lawyers, and doctors are classic examples of fiduciaries: they handle our
money, secrets, and lives under duties of loyalty and care.25 5 As Jack Balkin
has observed, fiduciary duties are "duties of trust;" the wordfiduciary even
comes from the Latin word for trust.25 6 And, as we have seen, we share
information with others in contexts of trust. 25 7 Even Justice Gorsuch
recognized this point in his dissent in Carpenterv. United States,2 5 8 where
he challenged the Third Party Doctrine's erosion of privacy by noting that
"[p]eople often do reasonably expect that information they entrust to third

250.
251.
252.
7:39

Id. at 1625-29.
Id. at 1618.
See April Glaser, Why Facebook'sLatest Ban Was So Underwhelming, SLATE (May 3, 2019,
PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2019/05/facebook-alex-jones-ban-underwhelming.html

[https://perma.cc/ZUQ4-CBEZ].
253. See HARTZOG, PRIVACY'S

BLUEPRINT,

supra note 21, at 197.

254.

See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciariesand the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1183 (2016).

255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 1207-08.
Id. at 1208.
See also WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS
138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018).

TRUST,

supra note 24, at 49-60.

1574

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 96:1537

25 9

A bill proposed at the end of the 115th
of Hawaii reflected some of these
Schatz
Brian
Senator
by
Congress
26 °
ideas.
Technology companies running technosocial platforms should be
considered information fiduciaries for the same reasons that doctors,
lawyers, and investment advisers are considered traditional fiduciaries. We
are vulnerable to them because they know everything about us. We are
dependent on them because of the services they provide and the expertise
they bring to those services. And they hold themselves out as sufficiently
2 61
trustworthy to gain our business.
This would have profound effects on users, design, and corporate
policies. Information fiduciaries should, first and foremost, never act like
"con men." Conning users would be like using dark patterns to purposely
extract personal information against user wishes or Google Maps holding
itself out as providing the best or fastest route from JFK International
Airport to the West Village and then delivering a route that drives passed a
Chipotle because Chipotle paid Google $100. Information fiduciaries would
not be able to leverage data in ways that violate social norms. Nor could
26 2
An
they use our data to manipulate, lie, or take away our freedom.
knowing
cards
credit
our
use
us
let
would
approach
fiduciaries
information
our purchasing histories will not be abused for profit. We could share
personal information to find love and companionship. We could use Alexas
or Cortanas knowing no one was listening in without our consent.

parties ... will be kept private.,

2. Empowering the FTC
We need a privacy regulator capable of investigating and rooting out
corporate deception and manipulation that is subtler, yet far more insidious
than lying on a privacy policy. An information fiduciary approach would
help, but as Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog have shown, the FTC
already has a long track record of regulating deceptive practices that erode
our privacy.263 To guard against social robots creating false veneers-socalled "Wizard-of-Oz" setups and misleadingly operated devices, for
259. Id. at 2263 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
260. Data Care Act, S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018), https://www.congress.govibill/I 15thcongress/senate-bill/3744 [https://perma.cc/4PWJ-B4RV].
See WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST, supra note 24, at 86-87; see also Balkin, supra note
261.
254, at 1222-23; Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies
2
Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 016/10/
7-7Y4Z].
information-fiduciary/502346/ [https://perma.cc/QCG
262. See Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 261.
263. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 195, at 631-45. 1 am skeptical of the FTC becoming a
robust privacy regulator for systemic, structural, and political reasons. That discussion is beyond the
scope of this paper, but will be discussed in future research.
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example 264-Hartzog notes that the FTC has already challenged deceptive
demonstrations that present products as better than they actually are.265 And
to address the ways in which robots gather information while evading
traditional notice modalities, Hartzog notes that the FTC should take Ryan
Calo's suggestion to shift to requiring "visceral" notices that leverage "a
consumer's very experience of a product or service to warn or inform." 266
In short, the FTC can pay additional attention to predatory, unfair, or
deceptive design that elicits disclosure while eroding trust. Its steps in that
direction are promising, but insufficient. For example, in Sony BMG, the
FTC challenged a design decision that automatically installed digital rights
management software on customers' computers without notice and without
a reasonable simple way of removing it. 267 In Frostwire, the FTC took
action when a program automatically designated some files available for
public sharing, suggesting an interest in default settings. 268 Although both
of these cases involve design, the FTC is still slow to give up its reliance on
broken promises litigation. In Sony BMG, for instance, the phrase
"Respondent has failed to disclose, or has failed to disclose adequately,
that" prefaces two substantive allegations against the company; 2 69 the third
simply alleged that deceptive software was "installed on consumers'
computers without adequate notification and consent., 270 Frostwire more
squarely addressed design, 271 but even there the FTC noted that the company
failed to disclose what its software would actually do. 272 Emphasizing the
role trust plays in user privacy and safety means recognizing that certain
design choices can be deceptive even with conspicuous notice. The FTC
isn't there yet.

264. See Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, supra note 160, at 793-94.
265. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 195, at 630-33; see also Volvo N.A. Corp., 115 F.T.C. 87
(1992) (finding an advertisement that depicted a monster truck crushing all rival cars except a Volvo
deceptive because the Volvo in the ad, unlike Volvo's sold to customers, had been reinforced while the

other cars' rooves were weakened).
266. See Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, supra note 160, at 818 (quoting Calo, Against
Notice Skepticism, supra note 162, at 1030).
267. Complaint, Sony BMG Music Entm't, F.T.C. File No. 062 3019, No. C-4195 (F.T.C. June
28, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2007/01/070130cmp0623019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q99B-PP39] [hereinafter Sony BMG Complaint].
268. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 13, FTC v. Frostwire,
LLC, No. 1 -cv-23643 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
cases/201 1/10/11101 Ifrostwirecmpt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BYR5-3KKX]
[hereinafter
Frostwire
Complaint].
269.
See Sony BMG Complaint, supra note 267, at
17-18.
270. Id. at 19.
271.
See Frostwire Complaint, supra note 268, at M 25, 30, 32, 35-37, 41 (alleging unfair design

independent of a failure to notify).
272.

Id. at

38.

1576

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 96:1537

The FTC also needs the ability to write rules to clarify its authority. The
purpose of agency rulemaking is to specify vague statutory requirements,
offering clear notice as to what the law requires, an opportunity to
participate in public governance, and a comprehensive resolution of
273
However, the
questions facing large numbers of persons and businesses.
FTC is limited by the "procedurally burdensome" process of MagnusonMoss rulemaking, 274 which requires the FTC to conduct industry-wide
investigations, prepare reports, propose rules, engage in a series of public
275
The process is so difficult that
hearings, and consider other alternatives.
27 6
the FTC has not engaged in this type of rulemaking in thirty-seven years.
This lack of rulemaking authority ensures that, without more, privacy
regulation from the FTC will remain vague; the only other way to discern
what the FTC means by a specific term or phrase is to turn to its previous
277
But that common
consent decrees, which is what many practitioners do.
can. If applied
rulemaking
clarity
of
level
the
achieve
law analysis cannot
deceptive"
and
"unfair
prohibits
only
to Section 5 of the FTC Act, which
what
clarify
help
could
practices, and any other privacy statute, rulemaking
companies have to do to ensure trust-enforcing design.

273. See William S. Jordan II, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Information
Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 394 (2000).
274. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 195, at 620. In his comprehensive analysis of the history and
development of the FTC, Chris Hoofnagle notes that after several years of rulemaking authority, the
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980 placed additional procedural hurdles in the FTC's
rule-making powers. For example, the Act introduced direct Congressional oversight. And the law
explicitly prohibited the FTC from using funds for three years "for the purpose of initiating any new
rulemaking proceeding . . . which prohibits or otherwise regulates any commercial advertising." See
CHRIS J. HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 65 (2016) (citing Pub.
L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 474 (1980)). Even though that ban only explicitly applied for three years, the
procedural burdens remain and the Act did much "political and psychological damage to the Agency."
Id. Notably, the FTC does have general rulemaking authority under the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade
Commission'sInvestigative andLaw Enforcement Authority, at app. C, FTC (July 2008), http://www.ftc.
gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/824H-FNT2] ("Special Statutes that
mandate or authorize Commission rulemakings either antitrust and/or consumer protection related...
include the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act ... [and] COPPA .... ").
275. FED. TRADE COMM'N, RULEMAKING: OPERATING MANUAL, CHAPTER SEVEN, https://www.f
[https://per
tc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/ftc-administrative-staff-manuals/ch07rulemaking.pdf
ma.cc/PAA2-ZGC P] (describing rulemaking procedures).
276. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 195, at 620 n.176.
277. Id. at 585 ("Those involved with helping businesses comply with privacy law--from chief
privacy officers to inside counsel to outside counsel--parse and analyze the FTC's settlement
agreements, reports, and activities as if they were pronouncements by the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve.").
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3. Privacy by Design
We can also build on the model of the GDPR and codify privacy by
design as a legal mandate.278 Privacy by design is the notion that privacy
should be part of the design process for new technologies rather than tacked
on at the end as an afterthought. It is meant to proactively protect consumer
privacy and reduce the risks consumers face when using data collection
tools while making privacy a priority inside technology companies. 7 9
But beyond this general understanding, there remains considerable
uncertainty as to what privacy by design will mean in practice. The GDPR's
formulation is so broad it is almost devoid of meaning, only requiring data
collectors take technical and organizational steps to implement the data
protection principles listed elsewhere in the GDPR. 280 The academic
literature includes no fewer than seven other definitions of privacy by
design, none of which gives companies, consumers, and regulators
sufficient notice as to the law's practical requirements. 2 8 1 Elsewhere, I have
argued that privacy by design can transition to privacy's law of design by
learning from the law of products liability for design defects. It would then
require technology companies to, throughout a product's lifecycle, balance
the products' benefits to consumers against their foreseeable privacy risks
and only place in commerce those products that achieve reasonably similar
consumer benefit with the least privacy risk. This duty would include the
responsibility to inform users, throughout the lifecycle of products, of how
the products collect and process data and of all foreseeable privacy risks in
a manner that adequately and comprehensibly conveys those risks to an
ordinary user.2 82 By providing a specific legal frame in which designers can
innovate new technologies, this formulation of privacy by design would
both provide for trust and encourage the organizational changes necessary
to make privacy a priority in the ethos and practice of a company.

278. See GDPR, supra note 220, art. 25, at 48.
279. See ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN 3 (2009), https://www.ipc.on.ca/wpcontentluploads/Resources/PrivacybyDesignBook.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4CW-C6YU]; see also ANN
CAVOUKIAN,
PRIVACY
BY
DESIGN: THE
SEVEN FOUNDATIONAL
PRINCIPLES
(2009),
https://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/resources/7foundationalprinciples.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5M4T-FQ58].
280. See GDPR, supra note 220, art. 25, at 48 ("the controller shall ......
implement appropriate
technical and organisational measures ... which are designed to implement data-protection principles.

in an effective manner").
281. See Waldman, Privacy's Law of Design, supra note 26, at 1253-56.
282. Id. at 1285.
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4. Reform to Section 230
More immediate relief can come from modest reform to the broad
immunity of Section 230.283 Danielle Citron and Benjamin Wittes have
proposed that Section 230 immunity be extended only to "good
Samaritans," or "providers or users engaged in good faith efforts to restrict
illegal activity."2 84 This is a good idea, and one that would incent platforms
to protect their users and foster the kind of trust necessary for social
interaction while preserving robust speech online and protecting companies
from being buried under lawsuits for honest mistakes.
Protecting only those platforms that act in good faith is, in fact, what
2 85
Section 230(c)(2), 2 8 which
Congress intended from the beginning.
immunizes platforms from suits related to any "action voluntarily taken in
good faith to restrict access to... material that... [is] harassing or otherwise
287
objectionable," is actually called the "Good Samaritan" provision. It was
meant to incent trust-enhancing design, not create social spaces that look
like the Wild West. That the federal courts interpreting Section 230 turned
away from Congressional intent and the plain language is an accident of
history: a bug, rather than a feature, of the law.
This kind of limitation on platform immunity would protect platforms
that earnestly try to filter out harassing content but make honest mistakes.
It would, however, constrain those platforms that ignore their users'
consistent complaints about racism, harassment, revenge pornography, and
other behaviors that violate terms of service and make technosocial spaces
unsafe. It would, in short, buttress content moderation designed for user
safety and trust.
CONCLUSION

This Article began with a problem: technosocial spaces can be unsafe
and privacy invasive. But it also saw an opportunity: to learn by analogy
from offline social spaces-Alcoholics Anonymous, teams of coworkers,
and attorney-client relationships-that facilitate socially beneficial
disclosures by counterbalancing norms of disclosure with equally powerful
norms of trust that are both endogenously designed and exogenously
283. See supra notes 210-219 and accompanying text.
284. Citron & Wittes, supra note 213, at 416.
285. For a more comprehensive review of the "origin story," please see id. at 404-411.
286. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
287. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230 (b)) (Section
230 was meant "(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer
services and other interactive media; (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State

regulation").
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supported by law. With those analogies in mind, the Article proposed
several specific ways trust can be designed in to technosocial spaces using
code and four legal levers-fiduciary law, consumer protection, products
liability, and intermediary liability-that could be leveraged to support trust
and safety.
This article is also situated in a growing scholarly literature on trust and
the law. Although its focus was on how trust and law can affect
technologically mediated social life, trust also plays important roles in our
relationships to government, law enforcement, health care companies,
landlords, employers, and more. This research agenda is, therefore, ripe for
growth.
In the end, no social spaces, online or offline, can always be safe. Life
involves risk, and so do disclosures, social networking, online dating, and
the conveniences of modem life. But privacy and safety remain relevant.
Privacy, expectations of confidentiality and discretion, and relief from hate
and harassment are all necessary for identity formation, intellectual
freedom, and equality. As such, they are essential to a well-functioning
democracy, increasingly under threat today. Design and law can play
guiding and expressive roles in support of these goals.

